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Preemption and Medical Devices:
The Courts Run Amok
Robert S. Adler"
RichardA. MannI. INTRODUCTION

Attitudes toward regulation and litigation as means of promoting public
health and safety constantly evolve in the United States. During the so-called
"Consumer Decade,"' from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies, Congress, in
reaction to the strong national anti-business sentiment that prevailed during
this period,2 enacted a great number of consumer protection laws, many in the
area of health and safety.3 In parallel, the courts and various state legislatures
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Kenan-Flagler School of Business,
University of North Carolina. A.B., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of
Michigan.
** Professor of Legal Studies, Kenan-Flagler School of Business, University of
North Carolina. B.S., University of North Carolina; J.D., Yale University.
1. Of 47 federal consumer protection laws enacted between 1891 and 1972,
"fewer than half, or 21 statutes, were enacted in the first 75 years, and the remaining
26 were enacted [in the years from] 1966-1972." This led some observers to call the
latter period the "Consumer Decade." Teresa M. Schwartz, The ConsumerProduct
Safety Commission:A FlawedProduct of the Consumer Decade,51 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 32, 34 n.2 (1982).
2. See DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FoRTUNEs: THE POLiTCAL POWVER OF
BusINEsS IN AMERICA (1989) (noting the dramatic drop in public confidence in
business during the consumer decade: "between 1968 and 1977, the percentage of
Americans who believed that 'business tries to strike a fair balance betweenprofits and
the interests of the public' declined from 70 percent to 15 percent.").
3. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-563, 80 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431) (1988 & Supp. 1991);
ConsumerProduct Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1988 & Supp. 1991);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678) (1976 and Supp. V. 1981); Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended
'in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). See also ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER

MovEMENT: GuARDrANs OF THE MARKETPLACE (1989) (describing the historical
development of consumer groups and documenting their achievements during the
1960s and 1970s); PETER W. HUBER, LiABILry: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 26 (1988) (describing the "spate of new legislationrivaled only bythe
New Deal laws in scope and complexity" relating to matters of food, drink, "cars, toys,
power plants, pesticides, and consumer products of every description" enacted during
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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expanded tort doctrines, especially those relating to product liability! In
recent years, however, the courts and legislatures, responding to the concerns
of business, have retreated from the expansion of health and safety protections
for consumers and workers.
Perhaps the most dramatic indication that the courts have shifted attitudes
on health and safety matters comes from recent cases relating to medical
devices and preemption. Medical devices include a vast array of products
from "bedpans to brainscans" 6-in all, roughly 1,700 different types of

medical devices are produced in over 7,000 establishments, which turn out
more than 41,000 separate products.'

A growing number of courts' have

this period).
4. In particular, the promulgation of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
led to a rapid expansion of the doctrine of "strict liability." Within a few years, the
vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States had adopted some form of strict
product liability. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY:
CASES AND MkTERALs 195-96 (1980) (noting that the "general adoption of the
doctrine [of strict liability] in this country from 1963 to the mid-1970s is one of the
most rapid and dramatic doctrinal developments ever to occur in the law of torts").
5. See VOGEL, supranote 2, at 283 (noting that since the Reagan Administration
took office, the trend toward increased government regulation of corporate social
conduct "dramatically slowed"). See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal
Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REy. 479 (1990) (detailing a broad doctrinal change among
the courts to favor defendants in product liability cases beginning in the early to mid1980s); David Strauss, Whose ConfirmationMess?,THEAMERICAN PROsPECT 91, 9394 (Summer 1994) (describing the appointment of more than 550 federal district court
judges by the Reagan and Bush Administrations as the "systematic conservative
stacking of the lower courts"). Even juries appear to have shifted attitudes: A firm
that publishes national jury verdict trends, Jury Verdict Research, has concluded that
juries "nationwide have become markedly tougher on people who sue doctors,
insurance companies and other deep-pocket defendants, sidingless oftenwithplaintiffs.
And there is evidence that the size of the awards has leveled off, too." Richard PerezPefia, U.S. Juries Grow Tougher on Those Seeking Damages,N.Y. TIMEs, June 17,
1994, at Al.
6. STAbF OF HousE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HousE CoM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98Ti CONG., IST SESs., REPORT ON
MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA's NEGLECTED CHILD 1 (Comm. Print 98-F
1983) [hereinafter FDA's NEGLECTED CHILD].
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 1994)
(intraocular lens), petitionfor cert.filed _U.S.L.W. __; Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc.,
18 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (pacemaker); Hinners v. Optical Radiation Corp., 15 F.3d
1096 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (intraocular lens); Duncan v. IOLAB Corp., 12
F.3d. 194 (11th Cir. 1994) (intraocular lens); Stampsv. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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rejected injured consumers' claims against device manufacturers on the basis
that the claims are preempted by the 1976 Medical Device Amendments
("MDA")9 to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.1" The courts have
become particularly aggressive in doing so since the U.S. Supreme Court's

(5th Cir. 1993) (bovine collagen used as anti-wrinkle treatment), cert. denied, 114 S.

Ct. 86 (1993); Kingv. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (lst Cir. 1993) (bovine collagen
used as anti-wrinkle treatment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Slater v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992) (intraocular lens), cert.denied, 113 S.
Ct. 327 (1992); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989)
(tampon), reh'gdenied, 873 F.2d 297 (1989); Michaelv. Shiley, Inc., No. 93-1729,
1994 WL 59349 (E.D. Pa. February 25, 1994) (Bjork-Shiley heart valve); Griffin v.
Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396 (D. Md. 1994) (pacemaker); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc.,
835 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (Bjork-Shiley heart valve); Reiter v. Zimmer,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. N.Y. 1993) (bone cement); Cameronv. Howmedica, Div.
of Pfizer Hosp. Products Group, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (artificial
hip); Hunsakerv. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (intraocular lens)
affd, 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993); Coveyv. Surgidev Corp., 815 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D.
Ohio 1993) (intraocular lens); Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 794 F. Supp. 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (heart valve), affd in part and rev'd in part, 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.

1993), rehearing,842F. Supp. 747 (S.D. N.Y. 1994); Bejamo v. International Playtex,
Inc., 750 F. Supp. 443 (D. Idaho 1990) (tampon); Northrip v. International Playtex,
Inc., 750 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (tampon); Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp.,
712 F. Supp. 13 (D. Conn. 1989) (breast implant); Rinehart v. International Playtex,
Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (tampon); Stewart v. International Playtex,
Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1987) (tampon); Green v. Dolsky, 641 A. 2d. 600 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994). But see National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38
F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1994) (tampon); Oliver v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp.
251 (W.D. Pa. 1994); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
Mulligan v. Pfizer, 850 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (prosthetic knee); Callan v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989) (intrauterine device); Kociemba
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988) (intrauterine device);
Evarets v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (pacemaker), reh'g
grantedandopinion amended, 843 P.2d 144 (Haw. 1992); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co.,
738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987) (intrauterine device).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "Medical Device Amendments" or "MDA"]. For
an overview of the legislative history of the Medical Device Amendments, see AN
ANALyTIcAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS OF 1976

(Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. & Robert A. Spiegel eds., 1976) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

10. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1982).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group," which declared that the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 196912 preempted certain state tort claims.
In this Article, we review the law relating to preemption, the Cipollone
decision, the preemption provisions of the MDA, the regulations issued by the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") relating to preemption, and the impact
of Cipollone on court interpretations of the MDA. Based on our review of the
intended preemptive effect of the MDA, we conclude that it is unlikely that
either Congress or the FDA intended for the MDA to preempt state tort
claims. Moreover, even if preemption were justified for some tort claims-a
proposition we reject-the courts have extended the rationale in Cipollone far
beyond anything that the Supreme Court intended in its ruling. In short, we
maintain that the courts have run amok in their rulings on preemption.
H. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Federal preemption arises directly from the "Supremacy Clause" of the
U.S. Constitution. This clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; ...shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the
any Thing in the Constitution
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
13
or Laws to the Contrary notwithstanding.
4
The meaning of these words is simple: federal law displaces state laws."
Although the Supreme Court has consistently espoused preemption since the
Court's ruling in M'Culloch v. Maryland," that state law which conflicts
with federal law is "without effect," ' this doctrine remained hotly debated
until its clear resolution by the Civil War.

11.
12.
13.
14.

112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
For further discussion of federal preemption see Barbara L. Atwell, Products

Liability and Preemption:A Judicial Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 181 (1991);

Richard C. Ausness, FederalPreemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44.
S.C. L. REv. 187 (1993); Jonathan S.Massey, FederalPreemptionofMedicalDevice
Tort Claims:Not What Congress(or the Doctor)Ordered,30 TRIAL 58 (June 1994);
Marilyn P. Westerfield, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does Congress
Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 263 (1989); Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation Federal
Preemption of State Common Law Products Liability Claims Pertaining to Drugs,
MedicalDevices and OtherHealth-RelatedItems,98 A.L.R. FED. 124 (1990).
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 433 (1819).
16. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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A. Some Difficulties in Applying Preemption

Theoretically, it should be an easy matter to determine whether a state
law must give way to federal law: simply look to the wording and, if
necessary, the legislative history of a statute to determine whether or not
Congress intended to invalidate contrary state law. 7 Unfortunately, this
determination has often proved extremely challenging-to the exasperation of
courts and commentators."
Sometimes, the difficulty arises from the
inherent ambiguity of language itself; even the most determined effort to be
clear on a point nonetheless may result in cloudiness.' At other times, the
difficulty arises from the not infrequent legislative resort to intentional
ambiguity when precision in language would provoke substantial
opposition.2" Finally, the difficulty arises from the lack of an accepted
protocol for legislatively invoking preemption. Despite the enormous quantity
of litigation Congress has spawned by its frequent fuzziness on the issue, it
never has developed a uniform approach to specifying in legislation its
intentions regarding preemption. Accordingly, the courts must search for the
extent of preemption in each new legislative pronouncement.

17. Courts, of course, also look to whether agencies, acting within the scope of
their "congressionally delegated authority," intend their administrative regulations to
be preemptive. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
Obviously, agency action requires a proper congressional delegation of authority.
18. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 14, at 190 (noting that despite numerous
product preemption cases in recent years, "federal courts remain hopelessly divided"
on the extent of preemption in products liability cases).
19. "There is... no infallible guide to good writing [and] no assurance that a
person who thinks clearly will be able to write clearly .... ." WiLLIAM STRUNK, JR.
& E.B. WHrrE, THE ELEmENTS OF STYLE 66 (3d ed. 1979). See also Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 381 (1941)

(discussing the difficulties of using words to convey thoughts).
20. See JACK DAvms, LEGISLATIVE LAw AND PRocEss 191-92 (2d ed. 1986) (A
bill's sponsor may choose intentional ambiguity when the sponsor fears that a "tough
bill will not pass." In such a case, "vagueness may cause those affected to overlook

some hazard in the bill or to decide they are willing to gamble on ultimately winning
the finessed decision. The sponsor then faces milder opposition and a simpler
legislative battle.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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B. Express Versus Implied Preemption
Although one can classify preemption in a variety of ways,21 most
courts 22 and commentators' typically divide the doctrine into two

categories: express and implied.
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly provides language
indicating that it wishes state laws to be displaced.24 For example, in the
Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA"), 25 Congress detailed in elaborate
fashion the extent to which it wished state laws to be preempted by the
CPSA 26 and the extent to which it wished them to remain in force.2
The fact that Congress has spoken expressly with respect to preemption,
of course, does not mean that it has spoken clearly. Whether Congress has
spoken clearly or not, interpreting congressional intent remains the key
challenge since the "purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in
determining preemption.' The task of determining congressional intent has

21. See, e.g., Ausness, supranote 14, at 192 (noting that preemption can "occur
in a variety of ways;" he divides it into the following categories: (i) express, (ii)
implied when a federal regulatory scheme totally occupies the field, (iii) implied when
a state regulatory scheme conflicts with federal regulatory objectives).
22. See, e.g., Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 ("Congress' intent may be 'explicitly
stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."')
(citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, (1977)).
23. See, e.g., Westerfield, supranote 14, at 264-66; Elaine M. Martin, The Burger
CourtandPreemptionDoctrine: Federalismin the Balance, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1233, 1235-36 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Hillsborough Countyv. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707,713
(1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983); Jones, 430 U.S.
at 525; Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956).
25. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1988).
26. See infra note 149 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988) (setting forth the
preemptive effect of the Consumer Product Safety Act)).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988) (stating, among other things, that "[c]ompliance
with consumerproduct safety rules or other rules or orders under this Chapter shall not
relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any
other person.") Further, Congress provided a scheme whereby states with regulations
providing a "significantly higher degree of protection" than CPSC rules and orders
could petition the Consumer Product Safety Commission for an exemption from
preemption. See infra note 149 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c) (1988)).
.28. WisconsinPub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,605 (1991); Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n Local 1625 v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). See also Rice v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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assumed even greater importance since Cipollone because the Supreme Court
stated that where Congress has expressly preempted state law, the courts
should refrain from any implied preemption analysis.29
2. Implied Preemption
Implied preemption occurs when courts infer from a regulatory scheme
that Congress intended to invalidate state laws, even though Congress did not
explicitly state that intent. Implied preemption can arise in a variety of
ways:3" when Congress passes legislation that is so comprehensive that it
occupies the entire field;31 when federal law conflicts with state law such that
compliance with both is impossible;3 2 and when compliance with both is

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("We startwith the assumptionthat
the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the federal act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").

29. As stated by the Court:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and
when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent
with respect to state authority," Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. at
505, 98 S. Ct., at 1190, "there is no need to infer congressional intent to
pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions" of the legislation.
[Citation omitted] Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a provision

defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that
reach are not pre-empted.
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
30. For a more detailed discussion of implied preemption see Atwell, supranote
14, at 186-91; Ausness, supra note 14, at 193-200; Westerfield, supra note 14, at
264-66.
31. See, e.g., Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 ("In the absence of an express
congressional command, state law is preempted . . . if federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field [that no room is left for the states to regulate]."); Fidelity
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) ("Congress has... occupied the field
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency"); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234
(1947) ("Congress did more than make the Federal Act paramount over state law in
the event of conflict. It ... terminat[ed] the dual system of regulation").
32. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 694 (1984) (state
statute barring the broadcast of advertisements for alcoholic beverages preempted by
FCC regulation requiring that cable operators broadcast out-of-state commercials in
full); FidelityFed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153 (implied preemption occurs

when state law actually conflicts with federal law and it would be impossible to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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possible, but state law prevents implementation of the objectives of the federal
law.

33

C. The JudicialReluctance to Impose Preemption
Historically, the courts have acted with extreme caution in holding that
federal law preempts state law. As the Supreme Court has stated, in order to
avoid "unintended encroachment on the authority of the states,"34 courts
should construe federal law with a heavy "presumption against the preemption
'
Accordingly, preemption will not lie
of state police power regulations. 35
"unless [it is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. "" Consistent with
its reluctance to find preemption absent "clear and manifest" direction from
Congress, the Supreme Court has indicated that ambiguous legislative
pronouncements by Congress will not support the displacement of state law,37
particularly in areas where the states have devoted many years to the
development of common-law doctrines. 38 This has meant, for example, that
the courts have been particularly slow to preempt state laws relating to health

comply with both); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133-34 (1913)
(preempting state statute that required labeling illegal under federal law).
33. See, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984) (Michigan statute that required nonmember
farmers of a state-organized bargaining agent for farmers to pay service fees or adhere
to contracts negotiated by state bargaining unit was preempted by federal statute that
did not require farmers to cooperate with such bargaining agents); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
34. See CSX Transp. y. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993) ("In the
interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the States, . . . a
court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by
state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption.")
35. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618; New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03
(1952)).
36. Ricev. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See also Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (interpreting
preemption of the common law without a clear congressional mandate "inevitably
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it
favors and which it dislikes"). See generallyCSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 112 S. Ct.
1732 (1993).
37. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
38. See, e.g., CSX Tramp. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993); Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 206; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 144 (1963); Medical Soc. v. Cuomo, 976 F.2d 812, 816 (2d Cir. 1992).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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and safety matters,39 especially tort claims," because such matters have
historically been the exclusive concern of the states. 1 Similarly, the courts
have shown extreme reluctance to find preemption where such a finding will
leave injured persons without a judicial remedy.42
One vivid example of the Supreme Court's reluctance to preempt state
law is Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.43 In that case, the father of a woman
who had been contaminated by plutonium at a federally regulated nuclear
facility sought tort damages for her contamination. A jury awarded actual
damages of $505,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $10 million.
Despite its prior ruling that Congress had intended to occupy the "entire field
of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the

states,i 44 the Supreme Court found no basis for barring the state common law
tort action. The Court cited two reasons for finding no preemption. First,
permitting preemption would effectively remove any means of judicial

recourse for victims of illegal conduct by nuclear facilities since Congress
provided no federal remedy for such victims.4" Second, subsequent to the
passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, Congress, in 1957, enacted the
Price-Anderson Act, which imposed an indemnification scheme with respect
to private lawsuits by aggrieved members of the public. Had Congress

39. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715 (1985); Abbot by Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th
Cir.), cert.denied,488 U.S. 908 (1988); New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers
v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 811 (N.J.1978).
40. See, e.g., Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715 (noting the presumption
against preemption of health and safety laws); FloridaLime & Avocado Growers,Inc.,
373 U.S. at 144 (determination of tort remedies "is a subject matter of the kind...
traditionally regarded as properly within the scope of state superintendence");
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993) (Federal Aviation
Act did not preempt state common law action for negligent aircraft design); Buzzard
v. Roadrunner Trucking, 966 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1992).
41. Hillsborough County,471 U.S. at 719.
42. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1990); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1953).
43. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
44. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 212.
45. Silkwood,464 U.S. at 251 ("[T]here is no indication that Congress even
seriously considered precluding the use of [state tort law remedies] either when it
enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 or when it amended it in 1959. This silence
takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy
for person injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
conduct. [citation omitted].").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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intended to bar tort lawsuits in the Atomic Energy Act, there would have been
no need for the Price-Anderson Act." In short, despite the awkwardness in
permitting state tort damages, the Supreme Court refused to impose
preemption." Absent clear direction from Congress that a different result
was intended, the Court left matters alone.
I]1. CIPOLLONE V. LIGGETT: A NEW APPROACH TO PREEMPTION?
Prior to the 1980s, few courts upheld preemption claims that would
invalidate state product liability laws.4" The 1980s, however, brought a
general judicial turn against plaintiffs in product liability cases" and the
courts began increasingly to interpret federal statutes as requiring preemption
in such cases."
A number of courts in the 1990s appear to view the 1992 decision of the

U.S. Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group51 as a green light to find
preemption in product liability claims, particularly with respect to medical
devices."
Whether Cipollone supports such an expansive approach to
preemption is open to question.
In Cipollone,the son of a smoker who had died of lung cancer petitioned

the Supreme Court to review a determination by the Third Circuit that various
tort claims brought on his mother's and father's behalf against a cigarette

46. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
47. According to the Court:

It may be that the award of damages based on the state law of negligence
or strict liability is regulatory in the sense that a nuclear plant will be
threatened with damages liability if it does not conform to state standards,
but that regulatory consequence was something that Congress was quite
willing to accept.

Id. at 256.
48. See JoHN S. ALLEE, PRODUCT LiABi.rrY § 8.09(3) at 8-67 (1994) (noting
that, until the 1980s, "[d]espite the potential for conflicting regulation by a federal
agency and by courts and juries in fifty states, courts were initially not sympathetic to
preemption claims in product liability cases (particularly those that would broadly
invalidate state common law product liability laws .... ."). See also id. (listing cases
under the Atomic Energy Act; the Flammable Fabrics Act; the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act in which the courts rejected preemption).
49. See generallyHenderson & Eisenberg, supranote 5.
50. See ALLEE, supra note 48, at 8-68 to 8-70.2 (listing cases upholding
preemption claims).
51. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
52. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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manufacturer were preempted by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969."3 Section 5(b) of the Act states:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposedunder State lawwith respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this Act. 4
In analyzing the preemptive effect of this language, the Supreme Court
reiterated the general presumption against preemption 5 and emphasized its
view that the courts should resort to implied preemption analysis only when
the legislature is silent with respect to preemption. 5' Notwithstanding this
cautionary language and the fact that the 1969 Act nowhere mentions the
common law,57 the Court found that the 1969 statute expressly preempted
certain state tort claims. This application of preemption contrasts with the
Court's assessment of the predecessor statute, the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act of 1965.58 The earlier act, according to the Court,
preempted only "positive enactments by legislatures or administrative agencies
that mandate particular warning labels"59' and not state common law tort
claims.

53. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
54. Id. § 5(b).
55. See supranotes 34-47 and accompanying text.
56. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.

57. Id. at 2620. The majority conceded that Congress "did not expressly include
common law within § 5's preemptive reach," but argued that this omission occurred
because Congress did not wish to preempt all state common law actions. Id. at 2621
n.22. The Court's view is a possible, but not necessarily the most plausible,
explanation for this omission. In the 1960s, when Congress enacted these laws, few,
if any, tort lawsuits had been filed against tobacco manufacturers. Accordingly, it is
likely that Congress did not think about the law's impact on tort claims one way or the
other. It is also quite possible that the law's drafters, wishing to avoid controversy,
intentionally left the preemption section vague. See also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340. The relevant sections of this Act read as follows:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act.
Id. at §§ 1334(a), (b).
59. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618-19.
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Why the difference? In large part, the Court focused on the change in
several terms from the 1965 Act to the 1969 Act. According to the Court, the
earlier Act focused on preempting federal, state and local rulemaking bodies
from requiring "any statement" that conflicted with the mandated warning
labels.60 In contrast, the Court observed, the 1969 Act bars "requirement[s]
or prohibitions] . . . imposed under State law."61 Moreover, the Court
indicated that the 1969 Act extends beyond statements in advertising to
include obligations "with respect to the advertising or promotion" of
cigarettes.62 These changes convinced the Court that the 1969 Act operated
with much broader effect than the 1965 Act.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court brushed aside the plaintiff's
arguments that the legislative history of the 1969 Act indicated a congressional

intention merely to "clarifLy]" the 1965 Act.63 To the contrary, according to
the Court, the 1969 Act went well beyond the narrow preemptive provisions
of the 1965 Act.'
The Supreme Court saw an additional reason to consider the words
"requirements and prohibitions" significant. According to the Court, because
common law damages arise from tort claims, they "are premised on the
60. Id. at 2619. The Court stated that:
[A] warning requirement promulgated by the FTC and other requirements
under consideration by the States were the catalysts for passage of the 1965
Act. These regulatory actions animated the passage of § 5, which reflected
Congress' efforts to prevent "a multiplicity of State and local regulations
pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages," H.R.Rep. No. 89-449, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965), and to "preempt [all] Federal, State, and local
authorit[ies] from requiring any statement ... relating to smoking and
health in the advertising of cigarettes.
For these reasons, we conclude that § 5 of the 1965 Act only
preempted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular
cautionary statements and did not preempt state law damages actions.
Id. (citation omitted).
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The Court stated:
We reject [this argument] as incompatible with the language and origins of
the amendments. As we noted in another context, "[ijnferences from
The 1969 Act
legislative history cannot rest on so slender a reed ....
worked substantial changes inthe law: rewriting the label warning, banning
broadcast advertising, and allowing the FTC to regulate print advertising.
In the context of such revisions and in light of the substantial changes in
wording, we cannot accept the parties' claim that the 1969 Act did not alter
the reach of § 5(b).
Id. at 2619-20.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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existence of a legal duty and it is difficult
to say that such actions do not
65
impose requirements or prohibitions.1
In response to the plaintiffs' insistence that common law damages actions
do not impose "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" of the sort contemplated by
the 1969 Act, the Court, with several justices vigorously dissenting,66
disagreed:
[S]uch an analysis is at odds both with the plain words of the 1969 Act and
with the general understanding of common law damages actions. The
phrase "[n]o requirement or prohibition" sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary,
those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common law
rules. As we noted in another context, "[state] regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of
preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is
designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
67
policy.'

65. Id. at 2620. Further, the Court said:
It is in this way that the 1969 version of § 5(b) differs from its predecessor:
Whereas the common law would not normally require a vendor to use any
specific statementon its packages or in its advertisements, it is the essence
of the common law to enforce duties that are either affinnative
requirements or negative prohibitions. We therefore reject petitioner's
argument that the phrase "requirement or prohibition" limits the 1969 Act's
pre-emptive scope to positive enactments by legislatures and agencies.

Id.
66. Justice Blackmun, with Justices Kennedy and Souter joining, challenged the
majority's view that the phrase "no requirement or prohibition" is so clear.
Although the Court flatly states that the phrase "no requirement or
prohibition" "sweeps broadly" and "easily encompass[es] obligations that
take the form of common law rules," . . . those words are in reality far
from unambiguous and cannot be said clearly to evidence a congressional
mandate to pre-empt state common-law damages actions. The dictionary
definitions of these terms suggest, if anything, specific actions mandated or
disallowed by a formal governing authority. See, e.g., Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1929 (1981) (defining "require" as "to ask for
authoritatively or imperatively: claim by right and authority" and "to
demand as necessary or essential (as on general principles or in order to
comply with or satisfy some regulation)"); Black's Law Dictionary 1212
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "prohibition" as an "[a]ct or law prohibiting
something;" an "interdiction").
dissenting).
Id. at 2627 (Blacknun, J.,
67. Id. at 2620 (quoting San Diego Bldg Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959)).
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The Court's heavy reliance on the point that tort damages can play a
regulatory function is surprising. Although the prospect of damages may deter
tortious conduct, prior to Cipollone, the Supreme Court had generally drawn
a sharp distinction between the direct state regulation of safety matters and the
incidental regulatory effects of damage awards. 8 The former was typically
preempted; the latter generally not. There are good reasons for this: although
damage awards do put pressure on companies to avoid behavior that brings
tort liability, they provide much more "wiggle" room for a defendant to decide
whether to alter its conduct than do regulations. 9 For example, a

68. As noted by Justice Blackmun in dissent, the Cipollone majority cited San
Diego Building Trades Council to support its holding that Congress intended to
preempt tort claims in the 1969 Act. But, on several other occasions, the Court had
found Garmon'sreasoning unpersuasive:
Not only has the Court previously distinguished Garmon,butit has declined
on several recent occasions to find the regulatory effects of state tort law
direct or substantial enough to warrant preemption.
In Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, for example, the Court
distinguished, for purposes of preemption analysis, "direct state regulation"
of safety matters from "the incidental regulatory effects" of damages
awarded pursuant to a state workers' compensation law. 486 U.S. at 185,
108 S. Ct. at 1712. -Relying in part on its earlier decision in Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256, 104 S. Ct. 615, 625 (1984), the
Court stated that "Congress may reasonably determine that incidental
regulatory pressure is acceptablewhereas direct regulatory authority is not."
486 U.S. at 186. Even more recently, the Court declined in English v.
GeneralElectric Co., 496 U.S. at 86 to find state common-law damages
claims for emotional distress preempted by federal nuclear energy law. The
Court concluded that, although awards to former employees for emotional
distress would attach "additional consequences" to retaliatory employer
conduct and could lead employers to alter the underlying conditions about
which employees were complaining, ibid, such an effect would be "neither
direct nor substantial enough" to warrant preemption. Id., at 85.
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2628-29.
69. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, effectively described the choices available to a
manufacturer found liable on a tort claims, such as failure-to-warn:
[The manufacturer] may decide to accept damages awards as a cost of
doing business and not alter its behavior in anyway. [citation omitted] Or,
by contrast, it may choose to avoid future awards by dispensing warnings
through a variety of alternative mechanisms, such as package inserts, public
service advertisements, or general educational programs. The level of
choice that a defendant retains in shaping its own behavior distinguishes the
indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive enactments such
as statutes and administrative regulations [citation omitted].
112 S. Ct. at 2628 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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defendant-perhaps believing that it did nothing wrong and convinced that
another court loss is unlikely-may choose to pay a tort judgment, but not
change its product. It has the freedom to risk paying future damages rather
than adjust its behavior.70 Thus, not preempting state tort law means that
state tort policies are neither automatically overridden by less stringent federal
rules nor are they automatically imposed upon companies who insist that their
products are safe. Absent some compelling reason, preemption of state tort
law seems unnecessary and inflexible.
Moreover, replacing state regulations with federal regulations addressing
the same risks is less likely to harm injured consumers than barring tort
remedies. The latter approach will prevent consumers from recovering
compensation
for serious injuries, illness or loss of life due to a defective
71
product.
Having rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the 1969 Act preempted no
state tort claims, the Court then specified which claims were preempted and
which were not. In doing so, the Court reiterated its view that it must
narrowly construe the preemption section in the Act. 2 To explain the basis
for its finding of preemption, the majority noted that Congress failed either to
mention expressly that common law tort claims were preempted or to include
a "savings clause" preserving common law claims. This, according to the
majority, made "perfect sense: Congress was neither preempting nor saving
common law as a whole-it was simply preempting particular common law
claims, while saving others."'73
We are skeptical that such a congressional approach makes "perfect," or
even common, sense. Surely---given the likelihood of confusion and
substantial liigation arising from the statute's ambiguous silence-if Congress
had intended to preempt some common law claims and not to preempt others,
it would have made far greater sense to state precisely which claims were to
be displaced and which were to be left alone.74

70. See, e.g., GoodyearAtomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 185-86.
71. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540, cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984).
72. See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621 ("[W]e must fairly but-in light of the
strong presumption against pre-emption-narrowly construe the precise language of
§ 5(b) and we must look to each of petitioner's common law claims to determine
whether it is in fact preempted."). This is a particularly unconvincing statement given
that nothing in the preemption clause mentions common law actions, let alone lists
which are preempted and which are not.

73. Id. at 2621 n.22.
74. The Court's construction of a set of preempted and non-preempted tort claims
particularly frustrated Justice Blackmun and his dissenting colleagues. In examining
the Court's approach, he stated:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the 1969 act preempted the
following claims: (1) failures to warn, insofar as they rest upon the
proposition that the defendants should have included additional, or more
clearly stated warnings" and (2) fraudulent misrepresentations, insofar as
they rest upon the defendants' false advertising to neutralize the effect of the
federally mandated warning labels.76 The Court held that the following
claims were not preempted: (1) warranties expressly made by the
defendants,7 7 (2) fraudulent misrepresentations, insofar as they concealed
material facts in violation of a state law duty "to disclose such facts through
channels of communication other than advertising or promotion," 8 or
(3) intentional conspiracies to misrepresent or conceal material facts
concerning the health hazards of smoking."
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS
Before passage of the MDA, the FDA could not review a medical
device-no matter the risk-for safety and effectiveness prior to its being
marketed unless the agency could convince a court to treat the device as a

Notwithstanding the Court's ready acknowledgement that "'[t]he purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis," . . . the
Court proceeds to create a crazy quilt of preemption from among the
common law claims implicated in this case, and in so doing reaches a result
that Congress surely could not have intended.
Id. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring/dissenting) (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 2621-22.
76. Id. at 2623.
77. The Court stated:
A manufacturer's liability for breach of an express warranty derives from,
and is measured by, the terms of that warranty. Accordingly, the
"requirements" imposed by an express warranty claim are not "imposed

under State law," but rather imposed by the warrantor ....

While the

general duty not to breach warranties arises under state law, the particular
"requirement ... based on smoking and health ...with respect to the
advertising or promotion [of] cigarettes" in an express warranty claim arises
from the manufacturer's statements in its advertisements. In short, a
common law remedy for a contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken
should not be regarded as a "requirement ... imposed under State law"
within the meaning of § 5(b).
Id. at 2622 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 2623. "Thus, for example, if state law obliged respondents to disclose
material facts about smoking and health to an administrative agency, § 5(b) would not
preempt a state law claim... ." Id.
79. Id. at 2624.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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drug."° In 1976, however, Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act' to provide the FDA with jurisdiction over medical devices.' The
primary purpose of the Amendments was to expand consumer protection
against dangerous devices,' prompted in large part by the emerging scandal

80. See, e.g., U.S. v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784
(1969) (cardboard disc impregnated with various antibiotics used to determine a
patient's antibiotic sensitivity); AMP, Inc. v Gardner, 389 F.2d. 825 (2d. Cir. 1968),
cert.denied,393 U.S. 825 (1968) (suture product used to stitch blood vessels together
during surgery).

81. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1982).
82. For a legislative history of the amendments, see ANALYTICAL LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supranote 9. For an overview of the development and implementation of
the Medical Device Amendments, see SusAN BARTLETT FOOTE, MANAGING THm
MEDICAL ARMS RACE: INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE
INDUSTRY (1992); THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REGULATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT (Norman F. Estrin, ed., 1990);
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEErING, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NEW MEDICAL
DEVICEs: INVENTION, DEVELOPMENT AND UsE (Karen B. Ekelnam, ed., 1988); Robert
B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. &

TECH. 1 (1989).
83. Among the key reports that convinced Congress to enact medical device
legislation was one by a blue-ribbon committee of the then Department of Health,
Education and Welfare calledthe Cooper Committee. See STUDY GROUP ON MEDICAL
DEvICEs, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL DEVICES: A
LEGISLATIVE PLAN (1970) [hereinafter, COOPER COMMrTEE REPORT]. According to
the Cooper Committee, medical devices were involved in 10,000 injuries and 751
deaths during the previous ten years. See also, H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1976) ("Absent clear, statutory authority to regulate medical devices, the
FDA cannot safeguard the health of the American public by assuring the safety and
effectiveness of [medical devices]."); S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976)
("Although many lives have been saved or improved by [medical devices], the
potential for harm to consumers has been heightened by the critical medical conditions
in which sophisticated modem devices are used and by the complicated technology
involved in their manufacture and use.... Increasing numbers of patients have been
exposedto increasingly complex deviceswhichpose serious risks if inadequately tested
or improperly designed or used.").
Some courts have suggested that Congress had a dual purpose in enacting the
Medical Device Amendments: safety and product innovation. See, e.g., King v.
Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 84
(1993). They justify preemption, in part, on the latter purpose. We find such an
argument unsupported by the legislative record. See infranote 126 and accompanying
text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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and substantial litigation concerning the A.H. Robins Company's Dalkon
Shield. 84
A. The MDA Regulatory Scheme
The MDA's regulatory scheme is a complex one, reflecting the wide
range of hazards associated with the broad array of products classified as
medical devices.' 5 Some devices, such as bedpans, present minor and
obvious risks and thus require only minimal regulatory scrutiny. Other
devices, such as pacemakers, are implanted into consumers' bodies and present
enormous risks. These products require extensive evaluation for safety and
effectiveness.
In order to provide the FDA with sufficient flexibility and authority to
regulate the diversity of devices under its jurisdiction, Congress established a
three-tiered scheme. Under this scheme, the agency must place all medical
devices into one of three classes.'
ClassI devices are the most simple and relatively risk-free devices. They
may be sold without premarket approval and need not conform to FDA safety
standardsY They must meet specified "general controls," such as good
84. As noted in the House Report on the 1976 Medical Device Amendments:
An example of a legitimate medical device which was marketed
without adequate premarket testing is the Dalkon Shield.... By mid-1975,
the Shield had been linked to sixteen deaths and twenty-five miscarriages.
Presently, more than 500 lawsuits seeking compensatory and punitive
damages totalling more than $400 million are pending against the
manufacturer of the Shield ....

H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
The Dalkon Shield was cited numerous times during the debates on the MDA in
both the House and Senate. 122 CONG. REC. H1719-1731 (daily ed. March 9, 1976);
121 CoNG. REC. S6139-6162 (daily ed. April 17, 1975). Liability claims eventually
led A.H. Robins to declare bankruptcy, at which time more than 300,000 women filed
claims against the company for Dalkon Shield injuries and illness. See RICHARD B.
SOBOL, BENDNG THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY

(1991); Stephanie Goldberg, ManufacturersTake Cover,72 A.B.A. J. 52 (July 1986).
From 1974-1986, half of all product liability lawsuits filed in federal courts in the
United States against pharmaceutical manufacturers were filed against A.H. Robins

with respect to injuries or death allegedly caused by the Dalkon Shield. See TERECE
DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILrY AND THE

IN FEDERAL COURTS

BusINEsS SECrOR: LrTGATION TRENDS

51 (1988) (study for the RAND Corporation).

85. See FDA's Neglected Child, supranote 6 and accompanying text.

86. 21 U.S.C.§ 360c(a)(1) (1992). Because some courts have imposedpreemption
according to the degree of regulation under the MDA, it is necessary briefly to review

some of the provisions of the Act.
87. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (1992).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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manufacturing practices ("GMPs"). Among the devices classified in Class
I are tongue depressors, elastic bandages, ice bags, and bed pans.
Class 11 devices present greater risks than Class I devices. As originally
enacted, the MDA required the FDA to draft performance standards for all
Class II devices because "general controls" under Class I were viewed as
insufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness."'
Unfortunately, the administrative complexity of promulgating performance
standards rendered this provision of the law unworkable," leading Congress
to amend it in the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990.91 Under the amended
procedures, the FDA may impose "special controls" that include, but are not
limited to, performance standards.' Performance standards are no longer
mandatory and may now be promulgated under simpler notice and comment
rulemaking procedures.' Examples of Class II devices include syringes,
bone plates, hearing aids, resuscitators, condoms, and electrocardiograph
electrodes.
Class 1!devices present the greatest risks and require the greatest
regulatory scrutiny: premarket approval ("PMA"). 94 This means that no

88. 21 U.S.C. §360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (1992). General controls relate to adulteration,
misbranding, registration, premarket notification, good manufacturing practices, and
reporting. A device meeting these controls is thought likely to be reasonably safe and
effective. See Leflar, supra note 79, at 7. See also Robert S. Adler, The 1976
Medical DeviceAmendments:A Step in the Right DirectionNeeds Another Step in the
Right Direction,43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 511, 512 (1988); David A. Kessler, et. al.,
The FederalRegulationofMedicalDevices,317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 357, 358 (1987).
89. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1988). See also Boguslaki, Classificationand
PerformanceStandardsunder the 1976 MedicalDeviceAmendments, 40 FooD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 421 (1985).
90. See FDA 'sNeglectedChild,supranote6, at 12 (describing the highly detailed
process of promulgating a performance standard involving as many as five separate

FederalRegister notices spread out over a lengthy period of time); Kessler, et. al.,
supra note 88, at 362 (estimating that it would require 50,000-plus staff years to
promulgate all of the devices that FDA had placed in Class II); Adler, supranote 88,
at 522 (describing § 360d as expensive, time-consuming, and ineffectual).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (1992).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(e) (1992). Special controls include performance standards,
post-market surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemination of
guidelines, and other appropriate actions as the FDA deems necessary to provide

reasonable assurances of safety and effectiveness. See Ellen J. Flannery, The Safe
MedicalDevicesActof 1990: An Overview,46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 129, 136 (1991)

(describing the changes set forth with respect to Class II devices).
93. Id.
94. The requirements for premarket approval are set forth in the MDA at 21
U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e (1992).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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device in Class III may be marketed until its manufacturer has submitted
extensive data that provide reasonable assurance that the device is safe and
effective. Each manufacturer must secure a PMA in order to sell the
device.95 Among the types of devices in Class III are pacemakers, IUDs,
intraocular lenses, and replacement heart valves.
At the time the MDA became law, thousands of devices were on the
market, all requiring classification and regulation. Had Congress insisted that
each device the FDA placed in Class III be withdrawn from the market until
it underwent premarket approval, the results would have been devastating
since the agency lacked the resources to process such large numbers of PMAs
quickly. Instead, Congress permitted currently marketed devices determined
by the FDA to belong in Class III to remain on the market while the FDA
Permitting these
evaluated them for safety and effectiveness.96
"preenactment" Class III devices to remain on the market, in turn, created
difficulties for devices in the same product category that were introduced into
the market after 1976. Had the "postenactment" devices been barred from
commerce until obtaining premarket approval, they would have faced an unfair
competitive disadvantage relative to the preenactment devices. Accordingly,
Congress provided a procedure, the so-called "510(k) notification, "that allows
a manufacturer to market a device "substantially equivalent" to a preenactment
device.'
As originally enacted, the 510(k) notification approach became the
procedure of choice for companies wishing to market new devices.9"
Alarmed by the large number of Class III devices entering the market without
premarket approval, Congress enacted the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990
to stiffen the requirements for companies seeking 510(k) approval. 9 As

95. For an excellent summary of how the premarket approval process operates,
see Leflar, supra note 82, at 9-22.

96. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c, 360e (1992).
97. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1992). Under this procedure, companies are required to
notify FDA ninety days in advance of distributing and selling a device "substantially
equivalent" to a device on the market. For a description and discussion of the 1976
MDA procedures, see Jonathan Kahan, Premarket Approval versus Premarket
Notification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 510
(1984); Alan H. Kaplan, Through theMaze of51O(k)s, 39 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 160
(1984).
98. In 1986, for example, 4,338 devices reached the market through the "510(k)"
route while only 72 devices did so through the PMA process. See HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1987). Included in the "510(k)" notifications
were 281 Class III devices, which claimed substantial equivalence to preenactment
devices on the market. Id.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (1992). See also Flannery,supra note 92, at 132-33.
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amended, section 510(k) requires more extensive disclosure of information
10 0
regarding safety and efficacy, including clinical data in appropriate cases.
In enacting the 1990 Act, Congress nonetheless insisted that the strengthened
requirements of 510(k) Were "in no way intended to establish the
determination of substantial equivalence as an alternative to premarket
approval." '' In other words, the 510(k) notification procedures, although
a route to the market, do not constitute premarket approval nor do they
constitute, to any significant degree, FDA approval of a device's safety and
effectiveness."0 2

B. Preemption Under the MDA
The controversy regarding preemption under the Medical Device
Amendments begins with section 360k of the MDA, 3 the Act's preemption
clause. In this section, Congress wrote the following language:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or
to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under this Act! 4
As we shall discuss, we believe that the courts have misinterpreted this

section. After this, we shall return to discuss section 360k to provide what we

100. Under the new procedures, companies seeking 510(k) approval must submit
a summary of the information on safety and efficacy-including clinical data in some
instances-on which they have relied in support of their request for a substantial
equivalence finding. In the case of Class I devices claiming substantial equivalence
to preenactment devices, the submitter of the 510(k) notification must pertify to FDA
that the submitter has conducted a reasonable search of all information known or
otherwise available to it respecting the preenactment device, and has included in the
510(k) notification a summary of and citation to all adverse safety and effectiveness
data with respect to the preenactment device and to the device it seeks to market. Id.
101. H.R. REP. No. 101-808, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 25 (1990) reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N 6318, 6319.
102. This point is critical in the debate regarding preemptionwith respect to Class
III devices that have reached the market through 510(k) procedures rather than through
premarket approval. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
103. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1992).

104. Id.
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believe is a more comprehensive and accurate analysis of it to demonstrate
that it does not bar common law tort claims.
V. THE COURTS' APPLICATION OF CIPOLLONE TO THE MDA
Prior to Cipollone, few courts addressed preemption under the MDA,
perhaps reflecting the prevailing view that compliance with FDA standards

constituted a "strong sword" for plaintiffs, but a "weak shield" for
defendants." 5 That is, a manufacturer's failure to comply with an FDA
standard generally triggered a finding in court of negligenceper se against the
manufacturer, but the manufacturer's compliance with an FDA standard
provided little protection against tort claims of a plaintiff. Of the courts that
did rule on preemption under the MDA, the results were mixed; some courts

found no preemption under the Amendments,"0 6 while other courts held that
the MDA barred at least certain tort claims."° Since Cipollone, however,

105. See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration
Regulation and ProductsLiability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INs. L.J.
194,243 (Winter 1987) (Analysis of product liability law governing drugs and medical
devices reveals that "[u]nder current law, compliance with the FDA requirements
affords only modest protection against the successful lawsuit ....
Conversely,
evidence of non-compliance can be a highly valuable offensive weapon for the
plaintiff, virtually establishing liability."). See also Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of
FederalSafety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121,
1123 (1988) (criticizing legislative proposals that "would alter dramatically the
longstanding judicial treatment of regulatory and statutory standards as generally good
measures of the minimum, but not the maximum, standard of care required by the
common law"); Frederick H. Fern, FDA StandardsAre Not the Final Word, 14 THm
BRImF 24 (Spring 1985) (discussing the case of Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical,
Inc., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 365 (1984), in which the
Kansas Supreme Court upheld an award of punitive damages against a manufacturer
despite its compliance with FDA-approved labeling).
106. See, e.g., Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989)
(intrauterine device) (noting that if CU-7 were a device, no preemption would apply);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988) (intrauterine
device) (noting that if CU-7 were a device, no preemption would apply); Larsen v.
Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (pacemaker), reh'ggrantedand
opinion amended, 843 P.2d 144 (Haw. 1992); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 738
P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987) (intrauterine device).
107. See, e.g., Bejamo v. International Playtex, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 443 (D. Idaho
1990) (tampon); Desmaraisv. Dow Coming Corp.,712 F. Supp. 13 (D.C. Conn. 1989)
(breast implant); Northrip v. International Playtex, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Mo.
1989) (tampon); Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ind.
1988) (tampon); Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C.
1987); Berger v. Personal Products, Inc., 797 P.2d 1148 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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the courts have been nearly unanimous in finding preemption," 8 in most
cases ruling simply that the preemption section in the MDA uses the same
word, "requirement," that the Supreme Court found preemptive in Cipollone.
To say the least, we find such an analysis inadequate and illogical. 9
A careful reading of Cipollone does not justify such an approach. First,
the Cipollone court did not rest its analysis solely upon the addition of the
words "requirements and prohibitions" in the 1969 Act. Had this been the

499 U.S. 961 (1991) (tampon).
108. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3rd Cir. 1994)
(intraocular lens); Mendesv. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13 (lst Cir. 1994) (pacemaker);
Hinners v. Optical Radiation Corp., 15 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(intraocular lens); Duncanv. IOLAB Corp., 12 F.3d. 194 (l1th Cir. 1994) (intraocular
lens); Rogers v. Optical Radiation Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (1lth Cir. 1994); Stamps v.
Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir. 1993) (bovine collagen used as anti-wrinkle

treatment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130
(1st Cir. 1993) (bovine collagen used as anti-wrinkle treatment), cert.denied, 114 S.

Ct. 84 (1993); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992)
(intraocular lens), cert.denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark, 867
F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (tampon); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., No. 93-1729, 1994 WL
59349 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1994) (Bjork-Shiley heart valve); Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc.,
840 F. Supp. 396 (D. Md. 1994) (pacemaker); Elbert v. Howmedica, 841 F. Supp. 327

(D. Haw. 1993) (artificial knee); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc. & Shiley, Inc., 835 F. Supp.
1015 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (Bjork-Shiley heart valve); Lamontagne v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 576 (D. Conn. 1993) (dental prosthesis); Reiter v.
Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (bone cement); Covey v. Surgidev
Corp., 815 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (intraocular lens); Hunsakerv. Surgidev
Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (intraocular lens); Bravman v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 794 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (heart valve), aff'd in part and
rev'd inpart,984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993), reh 'ggranted,842 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). But see National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988
(8th Cir. 1994) (no preemption of state tort law where defendants have failed to
comply with federal requirements); Oliver v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp.
251 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (MDA preempts state tort law only when FDA has established
specific "counterpart" regulations); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (MDA does not preempt state tort law); Mulligan v. Pfizer, 850 F. Supp.
633 (S.D. 1994) (tort claims not preempted by Medical Device Amendments); Larsen
v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (finding no preemption of
state tort claims by the Medical Device Amendments), opinion amended in part on
grantofreh g, 843 P.2d 144 (Haw. 1992); Evarets v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., 34
Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (claims for breach of express warranty,
negligence per se, and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations not preempted by the
MDA).
109. See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
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only change from the 1965 Act, it is at least debatable whether the Court
would have extended preemption to state tort claims.1
Second, unlike other health and safety legislative pronouncements that the
Court must review for preemptive effect, the 1969 Act detailed the specific
words of warning that must be used with respect to cigarettes and the arenas
in which they would appear. 1 Congress, in the 1969 cigarette act, wanted
those warning words required by the statute, all of those words, and nothing
but those words in the advertising and promotion of cigarettes. Congress is
rarely this prescriptive in other statutes, certainly not in the MDA.1'1
Third, assuming arguendo that Congress used the terms "requirements"
and "prohibitions" to preempt state tort actions in the 1969 Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act, that does not mean every time one or both of these
terms occurs in federal law that state tort law is preempted."' Although it
would make life simpler if Congress used words consistently from statute to
statute, it does not."' Interpreting a statute still requires an examination of
the words used, the context within which they are used, the purpose of the
statute, and its legislative history in order to understand its meaning.
Fourth, it would be particularly illogical to assume that Congress knew
in 1976 when it drafted the MDA that the Supreme Court would interpret the
word "requirement" in 1992 in Cipollone to include common law tort claims.
Yet, without such an assumption, virtually the entire argument in support of
finding preemption of tort claims under the MDA falls apart.

110. In addition to the changes in wording, the Court relied upon other
"substantial changes" in the law, for example, "banning broadcast advertising and
allowing the FTC to regulate print advertising" to reject the claim that the 1969 Act
simply continued the provisions of the 1965 Act. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619-20.
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988).
112. Nothing inthe MedicalDevice Amendments prescribes specific wording for
medical devices. To the contrary, FDAregulations specifically permit manufacturers,
without prior agency approval, to make labeling and other changes that enhance safety
with respect to regulated medical devices. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(1) (1986).
113. See, e.g., infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text (arguing that the term
"requirement" inthe preemption section of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act does
not displace state tort law).
114. According to Davies:

[L]egislatures are fallible institutions. Statutes are not the product of
months of work by a single brilliant individual who polishes it by rewriting.
Legislative acts emerges [sic] from the hubbub of legislative struggle, from
the drafts of beginning lawyers, from the work of lobbyists who are casual
about clarity but forceful about policy, from the chaos of adjournment
deadlines.... Eugene O'Neill dramas confuse; so do statutes. No one
should be surprised.

Davies, supra note 20, at 304.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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What is extremely disturbing about some rulings is the extent to which
the courts have expanded preemption beyond the relatively narrow holding in
Cipollone. In Cipollone,the Supreme Court took pains to emphasize the types
of tort claims that were," 5 and were not,' preempted by the 1969
cigarette act. Notwithstanding this carefully tailored holding, a number of
courts have granted summary judgment"' in cases where plaintiffs have

alleged fraud of the type specifically determined not to be preempted in
Cipollone,"' express warranty violations," 9 claims involving Class III

115. See supranotes 75-76 and accompanying text (noting thatfailure to warn

claims, insofar as they rest upon the proposition that the defendants should have
included additional, or more clearly stated warnings andfraudulentmisrepresentation
claims, insofar as they rest upon defendants' false advertising to neutralize the effect
of the federally mandated warning labels, are preempted under the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969).
116. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (noting that warrantyclaims
expressly made by defendants and fraudulent misrepresentationclaims, insofar as
defendants concealed material facts in violation of a state law duty to disclose such
facts through channels of communication other than advertising or promotion, are not
preempted by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969).
117. In order to dismiss a claim on a motion for summary judgment, a court must
find, based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Silver
v. City Univ., 947 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1991); Rosev. Communications Satellite
Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 1985). All inferences must be drawn, all
ambiguities must be resolved, and all doubts must be resolved, in favor of the nonmoving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,655
(1962); Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.denied,474 U.S. 1010
(1985). As one court put it, "[e]ntry of summary judgment indicates that no
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the losing party." Coach Leatherware Co. v.
AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). According to another court, even
where a trial judge is convinced that the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment is unlikely to prevail at trial or lose to a motion for directed verdict, the
judge must permit the case to go forward where there is a dispute as to material fact.
Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d. 21, 25 (6th Cir. 1976).
Notwithstanding these stringent requirements, the courts that have upheld
preemption have dismissed claims against manufacturers on motions for summary
judgment.
118. In Cipollone, the Supreme Court held that its ruling did not preclude fraud
claims "insofar as those claims rely on a state law duty to disclose [material] facts
through channels of communication other than advertising or promotion. Thus, for
example, if state law required obliged respondents to disclose material facts about
smoking and health to an administrative agency, § 5(b) would not preempt a state law
claim based on a failure to fulfill that obligation." Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2612.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

devices that had reached the market through "510(k) notifications" rather than
through premarket approval,"' and tort claims with respect to risks not

Notwithstanding this, a number of courts have refused to permit plaintiffs to proceed
with such claims under the Medical Device Amendments. See, e.g., King, 983 F.2d
at 1140 (according to concurring opinion, although plaintiff's fraud claim was
"troubling," the claim should be barred since FDA "was authorized to render the expert
decision on Collagen's use and labeling it, and not some jury or judge, is best suited
to determine the factual issues and what their effect would have been on its original
conclusions"); Kemp, 835 F. Supp. at 1022 ("Plaintiff has alleged that defendants
engaged in a campaign of disinformation against the public and the FDA. Even if
true, plaintiff's state law claims are still preempted."); Griffin, 840 F. Supp. at 397.
To suggest that Congress would exempt from tort liability a medical device
manufacturer who had acted fraudulently with respect to its obligations to the Food
and Drug Administration is to offer an approach that Congress has rejected in other
contexts, such as the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 1
to 300aa-34 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). In the vaccine act, Congress exempted from
punitive damages manufacturers that could demonstrate that they had complied in all
respects with requirements under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but specifically
withheld this exemption from any manufacturer "engaged in... fraud or intentional

and wrongful withholding of information from the [Food and Drug Administration]
during any phase of a proceeding for approval" of the vaccine by FDA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-23(d) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
In addition, to suggest that FDA, by itself, can effectively police risks in the
marketplace with respect to medical devices is to ignore the many instances in which
the agency has misjudged product hazards or has been unaware of them. See infra
note 192 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., King, 983 F.2d at 1135 (holding that plaintiff s express warranty
claims are preempted because any express warranties could arise only out of FDAapproved labeling and packaging); Kemp, 835 F. Supp. at 1018 (holding without
explanation that express warranty claims are preempted); Michael, 1994 WL 59349
(holding no breach of express warranty where plaintiff had had her Bjork-Shiley heart
valve removed because of numerous reports of deaths associated with the valve, but
where her specific valve, upon removal, did not appear to malfunction).
FDA regulations buttress the notion that "requirements of general applicability,"
such as warranty laws, are not preempted by the Medical Device Amendments:
Section 521 (a) does not preempt State or local requirements of
general applicability where the purpose of the requirement related either to
other products in addition to devices (e.g., requirements such as general
electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness),
or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to
devices.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1993). Afortiori, if a warranty of fitness is not preempted,
an express warranty, which a manufacturer has complete discretion to provide or not
provide, should not be preempted.
120. See Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396 (D. Md. 1994) (barring
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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To be sure, other
covered by specific "counterpart" FDA regulations.'
3
courts have refused to extend preemption as aggressively,' or at all,12

claims against implantable pacemaker that had reached the market through
determination that it was "substantially equivalent" to a pre-1976 device, even though
neither device had ever gone through pre-market approval). To say the least, the level
of regulatory scrutiny through this approach is minimal. See Leflar, supranote 82, at
46-58. Moreover, even taking Medtronic's pacemaker through the FDA's more
stringent procedures now required under the 1990 Safe Medical Device Act
amendments would not have constituted pre-market approval either for it or for the
pre-1976 pacemaker to which it claimed "substantial equivalence." See supra notes
101-02 and accompanying text.
121. Under FDA's preemption guidelines, "[s]tate or local requirements are
preempted only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific
counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a
particular device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug
Administrationrequirements." 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1993). Notwithstandingthe need
for specific FDA regulations, some post-Cipollone courts have found preemption
anyway. See, e.g., Bravman, 842 F. Supp. at 761 (despite "some reservation" in doing
so, court found preemption of claims regarding excessive noise associated with heart
valve even though there was a lack of any FDA regulation or FDA consideration of
noise when agency reviewed device); Cameron v. Howmedica, Div. of Pfizer Hosp.,
820 F. Supp 317, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (FDA regulation which merely identifies
artificial hip without establishing any requirements for risks alleged by plaintiff held
to be preempted by court). But see Elbert, 841 F. Supp. at 331 (finding Cameron
"unpersuasive, as the plain language of the FDA's regulations reveal").
122. See, e.g., Elbert, 841 F. Supp. 327 (holding that an FDA regulation that
merely "identifies" an artificial knee as a Class II device does not preempt common
law tort claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability); Lamontagne,
834 F. Supp. at 583 (holding that, although material used to make dental implant had
been specifically regulated by FDA, the dental implant itself had not been regulated,
accordingly no "counterpart" FDAregulation existed and preemptionwouldnot apply);
Reiter, 830 F. Supp. at 204 (plaintiffs negligent manufacturing claim against bone
cement producer not preempted).
123. See National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3 d 988 (8th
Cir. 1994) (no preemption of state tort law where defendants have failed to comply
with federal requirements); Olver v. Johnson& Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 251 (W.D.
Pa. 1994) (MDA preempts state tort law only when FDA has established specific
"counterpart" regulations); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (MDA does not preempt state tort law);Mulligan,850 F. Supp. at 635 (similarly
finding that, notwithstanding the ruling in Cipollone,the Medical Device Amendments
do not preempt state tort claims); Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273
(Haw. 1992) (finding that, notwithstanding the ruling in Cipollone,the Medical Device
Amendments do not preempt state tort claims); and Evartes v. Intermedics Intraocular,
Inc. 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (claims for breach of express warranty,
negligence per se, and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations not preempted by the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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but the net impression from the recent decisions is that the courts increasingly
are intent on discouraging, if not eliminating, any product liability litigation
under the MDA.
Motivating the courts in many instances appears to be a sense that
product liability claims must be suppressed because they fundamentally
impede technological innovation." Aside from the fact that such a view
is highly debatable, 1" virtually nothing in the MDA supports the notion that
Congress intended to implement a "protect technology at all costs" policy in
the MDA 26 To the contrary, the MDA represents a congressional policy
MDA).
124. See, e.g., Slater, 961 F.2d at 1334 (arguing that "ifexperimental procedures
are subject to hindsight evaluation by juries,

. . .

there will be fewer experimental

treatments .... ."); Kemp, 835 F. Supp. at 1023 ("If the preemption protection afforded
by the MDA were removed once a faulty device was pulled from the market, then the
fear and hesitancy in developing original and ground-breaking medical devices that
Congress meant to alleviate would always remain as a bar to the development of
needed devices that are potentially dangerous."); Gile, 1994 WL 160861 (arguing that
"state tort claims run counter to the important public policy, recognized by Congress,
of promoting scientific inventions").
125. For example, an industry group, the Conference Board, reported in 1987 that
product liability had had a beneficialimpact on product quality.
[W]here product liability has had a notable impact-where it has most
significantly affected management decisionmaking-has beeninthe quality
of the products themselves. Managers say products have become safer,
manufacturing procedures have been improved, and labels and use
instructions have become more explicit.
THm CoNFER NcE BOARD, PRODUCT LIANLrrY: TBE CoRPoRATE RESPONSE 2 (1987).

See also, Joan Claybrook, Products Liability: Serving All Americans, 26 TRIAL 27,
29-30 (1990) (arguing that it is a "spurious allegation" that the product liability system
undermines innovation or halts research investment in medical technology); PETER
REurER, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE LABIrrY: AN
EXPLORATORY STUDY 40 (1988) (study for the RAND Corporation). In the RAND
study by Reuter, documentation that the liability system impeded technological
progress proved elusive, if not non-existent.
Curiously, [our research] yielded few instances in which products
available in other nations have not yet been made available here by virtue
of liability concerns, and this seemed a reasonable test of whether liability
issues have yet had an impact on product variety. . . . [A]part from

Bendectin, no one could offer an example of a major product withheld
solely from the U.S. market as a result of liability concerns.
Id. at 41.
Moreover, why should medical devices be protected from tort liability any more
than other "high-tech" products such as drugs, automobiles, or computers?
126. Any fair reading of the legislative history of the Medical Device
Amendments will reveal that, except for a few passing references to the need to avoid
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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that unfettered and irresponsible device manufacturers must be held
accountable for public health and safety. 27
We reject the narrow approach of the post-Cipollone courts. For the
most part, they have rested their analysis on the fact that the word
"requirement' appears both in Cipollone and in the MDA and have concluded
that preemption should apply. Such reasoning ignores (1) the textual and
contextual differences of the Cipollone case itself, (2) the fact that Congress
does not use terminology uniformly across all of its enactments, and (3) the
limited preemption the Court found in Cipollone. To illustrate our concerns,
we propose to present a comprehensive analysis of the preemption provisions
of the MDA-an analysis that the post-Cipollone courts have done only
superficially or have failed to do at all.
VI. A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION

At the outset we note that there is no absolutely dispositive language in
the MDA regarding preemption and the common law. That is, nowhere in the
amendments or in the legislative history of the amendments does Congress
indicate that state common law tort claims are preempted128 or are not
slowing innovations in medical technology, see, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 853, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1976), the critical, and endlesslyrepeated, focus of congressional attention
was to protect consumers from dangerous devices. See Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1281, in
which the court, having examined the legislative history of the Medical Device
Amendments, stated:
[The legislative history of the Medical Device Amendments] reveals that
Congress was concerned with increasingthe protection afforded medical
device consumers under existing law rather than with restricting or
reforming the law in existence at the time of the Act. Moreover, in 1990,
subsequent to FDA promulgation of § 808.1(d), Congress amended the

Medical Device Amendments of 1976. The purpose of the legislation was
to "modify the underlying law in ways that will result ingreaterprotection
of the public health." (emphasis added). The 1990 amendments left § 360k
untouched, providing evidence that § 808.1(d) is an accurate reflection of
Congressional intent under § 360k.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6306).
127. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
128. A careful perusal of the entire legislative history reveals no mention of
preempting state common law tort claims. See 121 CONG. REc. 10,687-710 (1975);
S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070-103;
H.R. Coi\T. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 3, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1103-18; H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See also, Callan v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D. Md. 1989) (finding no preemption of state
tort claims under the Medical Device Amendments, in part, because "[tihe plain
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preempted."' On the other hand, with respect to tort claims under the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FD&C Act") generally, in 1933, Congress rejected
a provision in a draft of the original FD&C Act providing a federal cause of

action for damages because "a common law right of action [already]
exists."'30

We see nothing to indicate that Congress has changed its mind

since then.
The legislative history of section 360k focused entirely on legal
difficulties raised by conflicting state laws and regulations.' Congress was
concerned that several states, including California, had statutorily required

language of § 360k indicates that Congress intended to preempt state or local
legislation and administrative regulations governing devices.... The common law is
never mentioned, and there is no provision of a federal remedy for those wrongfully

injured by [unsafe medical] devices.").
As a general rule, one would expect Congressto provide either statutory language
or legislative history indicating its intention to wipe out common law tort claims given
the significance of such an approach. See Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F.2d 788 (10th Cir.
1989).
129. Congress sometimes, although not always, states specifically that it does not
wish to have common law tort claims preempted by federal agency rules. The courts
refer to sections that explicitly preserve common law claims as "savings clauses." E.g.,
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621 n.22.
130. H.R. 6110, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. Section 25 (1933); S. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess.'§24 (1933). See HearingsBefore aSubcommittee of the Committee on Commerce
of the United States Senate on S. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 400, 403 (1933).
131. According to the only portion of the legislative history that dealswith section
360k:
The Committee recognizes that if a substantial number of differing
requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdictions
other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly
burdened.... In the absence of effective Federal regulation of medical
devices, some States have established their own programs. The most
comprehensive State regulation of which the Committee is aware is that of
California, which in 1970 adopted the Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Law. This law requires premarket approval of all new medical devices,
requires compliance of device manufacturers with good manufacturing
practices and authorizes inspection of establishments which manufacture
devices. Implementation of the Sherman Law has resulted in the
requirement that intrauterine devices are subject to premarket approval in
California.
Because there some situations inwhich regulation of devices by States
and localities would constitute a useful supplement to Federal regulation,
the reported bill authorizes a State or political subdivisionthereof to petition
the Secretary for exemptions from the bill's general prohibition on
non-Federal regulation.
HR. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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premarket approval by the state of all new medical devices and compliance by
device manufacturers with good manufacturing practices.1 12 To the extent
that Congress mentioned common law tort claims, it was not to criticize them
or to suggest that they needed to be barred once a federal regulation was in
place. Rather, it was to note how they demonstrated that additional
protections for consumers were needed.'
With no "smoking gun" to resolve the issue, we turn to an examination
of the language and legislative history of the MDA for clues regarding
Congress' intent with respect to preemption."3 To do so, we search for the
meaning of the words of section 360k alone, the meaning of those words
when read together with the rest of the statute, the FDA's interpretation of
section 360k, and the meaning of the words when "read against the
'
background of that part of human conduct with which the Act deals."135

132. Id. See also Susan Foote, Loops and Loopholes, Hazardous Device
Regulation Under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and
CosmeticAct,7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101, 128-30 (1978) (explaining California regulations).
133. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 8 (1976) (citing "more
than 500 lawsuits seeking compensatory and punitive damages" against the Dalkon
Shield that might have been prevented had FDA had adequate authority to require
premarket testing). See also supranotes 83-84 and accompanying text.
134. Absent an immediately clear resolution of the congressional meaning of the

statute, one undertakes the task of interpreting the section and statute. Doing so
requires resort to principles of interpretation. How this is done is explained by Jack
Davies:
The basic rule of statutory interpretation is that statutes are to be read to
fArther the intent of the legislature. In the governmental scheme of
separation of powers, the legislature has the policymaking prerogative.
When a legislature has established a public policy, all the rest of the
community, including the judiciary, is to follow that policy as it expressed
by the words of the statute. But determining legislative intent is often
difficult, so formulae, canons of construction, practical guides, and folklore
have grown up around it.
Davies, supra note 20, at 294. See also Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't.
Stores, 15 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir. 1994) (if a statute is susceptible of more than one
reasonable interpretation, a reviewing court must look beyond language of statute in
effort to ascertain intent of legislative body).
135. John Willis, Statute Interpretationin a Nutshell, 16 CAN. BAR. REv. 1, 4
(1938), quoted in HoRACE E. READ ET AL., LEGISLATION: CASES AND OTHBR
MATERIALs 1091 (1959). See also Guertinv. Dixon, 864 P.2d 1072 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1993) (in determining legislative intent of statute, courts must consider context of
statute, language used, subject matter, historical background, effects, consequences,
spirit, and purpose of law); Buttelo v. S.A. Woods-Yates American Machine Co., 864
P.2d 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (when meaning of statute cannot be derived from
plain meaning of statute, court may use various tools of statutory construction to
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A. The Scope of Section 360k
Examining the words in section 360k(a) alone produces no absolute
answer to congressional intent since the section provides no definition of the
critical word "requirement." We note that the word "requirement" occurs three
times in section 360k(a). Only once, however, does the word appear to be
ambiguous. In section 360k(a)(1), the phrase "any requirement applicable
under this Act to the device" and in section 360k(a)(2), the phrase "a
requirement applicable to the device under this Act" can refer only to "positive
enactments" (i.e., legislative type rules) by the FDA, and not to common law
tort actions, since the FDA has no authority under the MDA to impose
requirements through common law tort actions. Whether Congress intended
the initial use of the word "requirement" before subsection (a)(1) in section
360k to be more expansive than its two later uses of the term lies at the core
of the debate about preemption. That Congress would adopt two separate
meanings of a word within one section strikes us as highly improbable.'
The next subsection of section 360k provides exemptions from
preemption. Because section 360k(b) was drafted at the same time as 360k(a)
and also pertains directly to preemption, it should provide more insight into
Congress' attitudes towards preemption than almost any other provision in the
statute.137 Section 360k(b) states:

interpret its meaning).

136. Such a reading would contradict the Supreme Court's dicta that a term
appearing at several places in statutory text is generally read the same way each time
it appears. E.g., Ratzlaffv. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994). See also State v. Bea, 864
P. 2d 854 (Or. 1993) (if the legislature uses the same term throughout the statute, a
court should infer the same meaning throughout the statute).
137. See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) ("We do not...
construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole. Thus, the words
...must be read in light of the immediately following phrase ....).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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(b) Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for
an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a), under such conditions as may
be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of such State or political
subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under
this Act which would be applicable to the device if an exemption
were not in effect under this subsection; or
(2) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device
to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this
138
Act.
This subsection is entirely inconsistent with an intent to have the term

"requirement" include the common law. How a state petitions the FDA to
grant an exemption for common law tort claims presents a mystery incapable
of solution. The prospect of a state filing a formal request with the FDA
under section 360k(b) to exempt from preemption each and every verdict in
tort suits is ludicrous,139 rendering this provision superfluous and
meaningless in such a context. 4 ' Clearly, Congress intended for this
subsection to apply only to legislative type enactments by the states and not

138. 21 U.S.C § 360k(b) (Supp. 1994).
139. As one court put it, "if the term 'requirement' were interpreted so as to
include tort law, the exemption procedures would be rendered absurd; is the State
supposed to petition the Secretary of Health and Human Services after every verdict
in favor of an IUD tort plaintiff?" Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 667.
140. The courts generally reject interpretations that would render parts of a statute
mere surplusage or meaningless. See Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Tech. Indus., 9 F.3d

1174 (6th Cir. 1993); Harley-Davidson v. Minstar, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis.
1993); People v. Hicks, 863 P.2d 714 (Ca. 1993).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

33

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

to common law tort claims. 4 ' Given this, it violates established canons of
statutory interpretation to read subsection 360k(a) in a different light.

B. Interpretingthe Medical Device Amendments As A Whole
Examining the words of the entire MDA provides little or no support for
the proposition that common law tort claims are preempted. Whenever the
word "requirement" is used elsewhere in the MDA, it seems clear that
Congress intended the word to refer only to legislative-type obligations
promulgated by the FDA.'42

141. FDA's interpretation of section 360k(b) focuses exclusively on legislativetype rules and appears not to contemplate the possibility of exemptions for tort
decisions. Section 808.20 states:
(a) Any State or political subdivisionmay apply to the Food and Drug
Administration for an exemption from preemption for any requirement that
it has enactedand that is preempted. An exemption may only be granted
for a requirement that has been enacted, promulgated, or issued in final
form ....
(c) For each requirement for which an exemption is sought, the
application shall include the following information...
(1) Identification and a current copy of any statute, rule,
regulation, or ordinance of the State or political subdivision
considered by the State or political subdivision to be a
requirement which is preempted, with a reference to the date of
enactment, promulgation, or issuance in final form. The
application shall also include, where available, copies of any
legislative history or background materials pertinent to
enactment, promulgation, or issuance of the requirement,
including hearing reports or studies concerning development or
consideration of the requirement. If the requirement has been
subjectto any judicial or administrative interpretations, the State
or political subdivision shall furnish copies of such judicial or
administrative interpretations.
21 C.F.R. §§ 808.20(a), (c) (1993) (emphasis added).
142. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360j(a) (Supp. 1994), which states:
(a) Any requirement authorized by or under section 351, 352, 360, or 360i
...
applicable to a device intended for human use shall apply to such
device until the applicability of the requirement to the device has been
changed by action taken under section 360c, 360d, or 360e ... or under
subsection (g) of this section, and any requirement established by or under
section 351, 352, 360, or 360i ... which is inconsistentwith a requirement
imposed on such device under section 360d or 360e... or under subsection
(g) of this section shall not apply to such device.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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One section of the MDA, Section 360h(d),"' appears particularly
inconsistent with the notion that common law tort actions are preempted by
the MDA. This section, which deals with FDA orders requiring producers and
distributors to repair, replace or provide refunds with respect to defective
devices, states:
(d) Compliance with an order issued under this section shall not relieve any
person from liability under Federal or State law. In awarding damages for
economic loss in an action brought for the enforcement of any such
liability, the value to the plaintiff in such action of any remedy, provided
him under such order shall be taken into account.'4
The section explicitly indicates that a company's compliance with an FDA
recall order will not bar tort claims against it.'45 Clearly, compliance with
an FDA order and compliance with an FDA rule both involve FDA imposed
requirements. Accordingly, it is perplexing to imagine Congress preempting
requirements imposed by FDA rules, but refusing to do so with respect to
FDA orders. This would be particularly baffling in situations involving the
mandatory recall of Class III products. If Congress intended to preempt tort
claims against manufacturers whose products complied with FDA regulations,
why would it not do the same for manufacturers whose product complied with
FDA recall orders? The illogic of such an approach strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend to preempt common law tort claims with respect to
FDA rules.

C. Examining the MDA's Legislative History
Having examined the words of the MDA, we next turn to the Act's
legislative history. This involves two separate analyses. First, we consider the
legislative history of the MDA by itself. Next, we look to other relevant
legislative enactments to help provide a social context within which to
understand the policies behind the preemptive provisions in the MDA.

Id. The references here are clearly to regulations promulgated by FDA and not to
common law tort actions.
143. Section 360h(d) represents a substantive provision of law related to tort
liability that operates in a manner inconsistent with a legislative scheme to preempt

state common law tort actions.
144. 21 U.S.C. §360h(d) (1984).
145. Of course, nothing in the MDA bars a manufacturer from offering its
compliance with an FDA order as evidence of due care. It would be up to a court to
determine whether, under the facts of a given case, a company's prompt response to
an FDA order demonstrated due care.
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1. The MDA By Itself
With respect to the MDA's legislative history, the most critical aspect to
note is the law's emphasis on strengthening protections from dangerous
devices for consumers.' 46 One court, while conceding that the "principal
"147
emphasis [of the MDA is] the protection of the individual user,

nevertheless insisted that a secondary purpose of the Act in promoting
research and development demonstrated a congressional intent to make FDA
requirements the "total maximum protection afforded the individual user."' 48
Contrary to the court's opinion, however, even a casual reading of the
legislative history reveals that the quotes lifted by the court carry no hint
149
whatsoever that FDA regulations should preempt common law tort claims.

146. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
147. King, 983 F.2d at 1138.
148. Id. According to the court, "[p]erfection is impossible and a few individuals
may be denied fMll protection at the cost of benefitting the rest." Id.
149. The court quoted from three separate portions of the Senate Commerce
Committee's Report. To say the least, these quotes are so general and irrelevant to the
resolution of the preemption issue that one is tempted to consider the court's
invocation of them to be misguided at best and disingenuous at worse. They read as

follows:
As medicine progresses, as research makes new breakthroughs, an
increasing number of sophisticated, critically important medical devices are
being developed and used in the United States. These devices hold the

promise of improving the health and longevity of American people. The
Committee wants to encourage their research and development.
S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1976).
S.2368 recognizes the benefits that medical research and
experimentation to develop devices offers to mankind. It recognizes, too,
the need for regulation to assure that the public is protected and that health
professionals can have more confidence in the performance of devices.
Id. at 6.
The Committee recognizes the rapidly changing nature of the devices
field and therefore feels that provisions must be made to amend standards
on the basis of improved technology or new scientific evidence. Such
amendments should be made in an expedited fashion so that appropriate
changes can be rapidly implemented. The purpose of this authority is to
permit new or improved devices to be marketed without delay so that the
public may have such beneficial devices available to them as soon as
possible.
Id. at 14.
None of these quotes support the court's proposition. The first quote, for
example, is quite out of context. Had the court included the very next sentence in the
Senate Report, an entirely different meaning would have emerged. The next sentence
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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2. Clues From the Consumer Product Safety Commission
We next examine the historical and social context of the MDA's
preemption provisions. Congress did not draft section 360k in a vacuum. To
the contrary, as it did with other provisions in the MDA, Congress borrowed
from the preemption provisions that it placed in legislation enforced by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC").

150

Specifically, as

Congress drafted the MDA in 1976, it was almost simultaneously' drafting
amendments to the preemption provisions of the four acts enforced by the
CPSC.1'5
The resulting legislation, the "Consumer Product Safety
Commission Improvements Act of 1976,"153 contained language substantially

similar to that used in the MDA, 5 1 in particular, the language that provided

states: "The Committee also wants to be sure that the FDA has the proper authority
to regulate that process so that Americans are not put at risk from the use of unsafe
and ineffective medical devices." Id. at 2.
The second quote does little support the court's point. If anything, it emphasizes
the need to regulate devices "to assure that the public is protected." The third quote
occurs in a section addressing the standards-setting authority under the MDA and
simply addressesthe need for quick and efficient amendment procedures for standards.
150. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1976) (noting that the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare included provisions in the MDA

related to stockpiling noncomplying devices prior to the promulgation of a safety
standard that are "analogous to provisions of the Consumer Product Safety Act"); Id.
at 16 (noting that the Committee "has been guided in the development of [§515 of the

MDA] by the provisions of [two acts enforced by the Consumer Product Safety

Commission],the Federal Hazardous SubstancesAct andthe Consumer Product Safety
Act"); H.R. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976) (noting that the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce added to the MDA a notification
provision that is similar to comparable authority contained in several acts, including
the Consumer Product Safety Act).
151. The CPSC amendments were enacted on May 11, 1976. The Medical
Device Amendments were enacted on May 28, 1976.
152. The four acts are the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2051-2083 (1982); the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (F-SA), 15 U.S.C. §§
1261-1276 (Supp.1994); the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1982);
the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1474 (1982).
153. Act of May 11, 1976, Pub.L.94-284, 90 Stat. 503.
154. As amended, § 26 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2075
(1982), now reads:
(a)State compliance to Federal Standards-Whenever a consumer product
safety standard under this Chapter isineffect and applies to a risk of injury
associated with a consumer product, no State or political subdivision of a
State shall have any authority either to establish or to continue in effect any
provision of a safety standard or regulation which prescribes any
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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5
Because
procedures for states to petition for exemption from preemption."'

requirements as to the performance, composition, contents, design, finish,
construction, packaging, or labeling of such product which are designed to
deal with the same risk of injury associated with such consumer product,
unless such requirements are identical to the requirements of the Federal
standard.
(b) Consumer product safety requirements which impose performance
standards more stringent than federal standards.
Subsection (a) of this section does notprevent the Federal Govermnent
or the government of any State or political subdivision of a State from
establishing or continuing in effect a safety requirement applicable to a
consumer product for its own use which requirement is designed to protect
against a risk of injury associated with the product and which is not
identical to the consumer product safety standard applicable to the product
under this Chapter if the Federal, State, or political subdivisionrequirement
provides a higher degree of protection from such risk of injury than the
standard applicable under this Chapter.
(c) Exemptions
Upon application of a State or political subdivision of a State, the
Commissionmay be rule, after notice and opportunity for oral presentation
of views, exempt from the provisions of subsection (a) . . . (under such
conditions as it may impose in the rule) any proposed safety standard or
regulation which is described in such application and which is designed to
protect against a risk of injury associated with a consumer product subject
to a consumer product safety standard under this Chapter if the State or
political subdivision standard or regulation(1) provides a significantly higher degree of protection from
such risk of injury than the consumer product safety standard
under this Act, and
(2) does not unduly burden interstate commerce.
In determining the burden, if any, of a State or political subdivision
standard or regulation on interstate commerce, the Commission shall
consider and make appropriate (as determined by the Commission in its
discretion) findings on the technological and economic feasibility of
complying with such standard or regulation, the cost of complying with
such standard or regulation, the geographic distribution of the consumer
product to which the standard or regulation would apply, the probability of
other States or political subdivisions applying for an exemption under this
subsection for a similar standard or regulation, and the need for a national,
uniform standard under this Act for such consumer product.
Id. Clauses similar to this were added to the other three acts enforced by the CPSC.
155. As discussed supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text, procedures that
permit a state to petition a regulatory body for an exemption from preemption make
no sense with respect to tort cases, thereby implying that common law tort claims were
not envisioned by Congress when it added preemption provisions either to the CPSC
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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(1) the CPSC acts and the MDA all address protecting the public from
dangerous consumer products, (2) the CPSC acts and the MDA were generally
written by the same congressional committees,156 (3) Congress drafted the
CPSC acts and the MDA more or less simultaneously, and (4) the CPSC acts
and the MDA adopt similar approaches to preemption, established principles
of statutory interpretation suggest that these statutes should be read
157
consistently.
Several significant points emerge from the preemption provisions of the
laws governing the CPSC. First, Congress never mentioned preemption of
common law tort claims as one of its purposes in enacting preemption clauses
in the four acts. To the contrary, Congress amended the preemption section
in the Consumer Product Safety Act without modifying that act's explicit

acts or the Medical Device Amendments.
156. In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce drafted laws for both the CPSC and for the FDA. In the Senate, the
Committee on Commerce wrote the CPSC acts while the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare wrote the Medical Device Amendments. The Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee expressly acknowledged borrowing language from legislation
goveming the CPSC. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
157. According to Davies, a statutory interpretation doctrine known as in pari
materiacontrols when two statutes relate to the same topic:
When more than one statute relates to a subject, the statutes must be
considered together. The reason for this is that the whole body of law must
be kept consistent with itself; one act must not be read to undermine or
distort another act. One consequence of this bonding of acts is that a word
must carry the same meaning from one statute over into another related
statute, just as a word should carry one meaning throughout a single
enactment. This canon makes the interpretation given a statute in one case
relevant in a later case involving a different, but related, statute.
Davies, supra note 20, at 310. See also Goulder v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 868
P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (indicating that statutes relating to the same subject
matter should be read inpari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain
harmony), aff'd, 877 P.2d 280 (Ariz. 1994); In re Markaus V., 260 Cal. Rptr. 126
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that word or phrases in a statutory provision that were
used in a prior act or closely related act pertaining to the same subject will usually be
construed to be used in the same sense); Richardson v. City of Honolulu, 868 P.2d
1193 (Haw. 1993) (laws in pari materia to each other should be construed with
reference to each other); AMISUB (Saint Joseph Hosp.) Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 508 N.W. 2d 827 (Neb. 1993) (stating that when a court considers a series
or collections of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter which are in pari
materia,they may be considered and construed together to determine the intent of the
legislature); Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Blueville Bank, 438 S.E. 2d 817
(W. Va. 1993) (indicating that statutes that relate to the same subject matter are "in
pari materia" and must be construed together).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

39

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

"savings clause"' 5 -- clearly indicating that Congress had no intent to
preempt common law tort claims. Second, Congress emphasized the need to
make the preemption provisions as uniform as possible.'59 Third, Congress,
in addressing preemption, used the terms "requirements" and "standards"'6

158. Section 25 of the Consumer Product Safety act states in part:

"(a)

Compliance with consumer product safety rules or other rules or orders under this Act
shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law

to any other person." 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1982).
159. The report of the Senate Commerce Committee, referring to the need to
amend acts governing the CPSC, makes this point clearly.
[T]his legislation addresses the question of the preemptive effect of Federal
safety standards. For the first time, it would provide a uniform Federal
preemption clause for the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the
FlammableFabricsAct,and the ConsumerProductSafetyAct. The general

rule would be that, if the Consumer Product Safety Commission has in
effect a requirementfora product established to deal with a risk of illness
or injury associatedwith that product, no State or political subdivision may
establish or continue in effect a requirementapplicableto that product and
designed to deal with the same risk of illness unless it is identical to the
Federal requirement. The exception to this general rule is that a State may
maintain such a requirementif (a) compliance with the requirementwould
not cause the product to be in violation of the Federal standard;and (b) the
State or local requirement provides a significantly higher degree of
protection than the Federal requirementand it does not place an undue
burden upon the manufacture or distribution of products in interstate
commerce.
S. REP. No. 251, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975) (emphasis added). See also the report

of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which states:
Uniformity of administration of Federalpreemption of State and local

requirements is provided by amendments to existing sections in the
Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the
Flammable Fabrics Act, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of
1970....
H.R REP. No. 325, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975) (emphasis added).
Aside from demonstrating a congressional intent to impose a uniform approach
to preemption, these excerpts demonstrate the use of the word "requirement" in a
contextwhere Congress clearly intended the term to apply only to positive enactments,
or legislative-type rules, and not to common law tort claims. It did so by referring to
the Consumer Product Safety Act, which had a "savings clause" expressly preserving
common law tort claims. Accordingly, Congress could not have intended to bar tort
claims. Moreover, in the Senate Report, they show the interchangeability of the term
"requirement" and the word "standard," further undermining the view that the term
"requirement" carries a meaning broader than legislative-type enactments.
160. We have seen no suggestion that Congress ever intended that the term
"standard" refer to common law tort claims.
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interchangeably"'-again suggesting that it intended only to preempt
legislative-type rules, not tort claims.
Given the Cipollone Court's focus on the word "requirement," we must
determine whether Congress intended it to be interpreted more broadly than
the word "standard" or "regulation." With respect to the acts enforced by the
CPSC, we conclude that the answer is clearly no. The act enforced by the
CPSC that most closely resembles the MDA in using the word "requirement"
is the Federal Hazardous Substances Act ("FHSA"). 1'62 We see no evidence
that Congress intended for this act to preempt common law tort claims while
preserving them under the other acts enforced by the CPSC. This conclusion
seems particularly compelling in light of Congress' express intention to make

161. See supranote 159 and accompanying text. See also Conference Report on
S. 644, in which the conferees stated with respect to whether a federal requirement
preempts state requirements:
[TIhe key factor is whether the State or local requirementrespecting a
product is designed to deal withthe same risk of injury or illness associated
with the product as the Federal requirement.Eventhough the State or local
requirementischaracterized in different terms than the Federal requirement
or may have different testing methods for determining compliance, so long
as the Federal and State or local requirementsdeal with the same risks of
injury associated with a product, the Federal requirement preempts a
different State requirement. For example, a Federal requirementwith
respect to bicycles would preempt a different State requirementforbicycles
so long as they were both designed to protect against the same risk of
injury, even though the State characterized its requirementas a "motor
vehicle" standard. Or a State standarddesigned to protect against the risk
of injury from a fabric catching on fire would be preempted by a Federal
flammability standardcovering the same fabric even though the Federal
standardcalled for tests using matches and the State standardcalled for
tests using cigarettes. When an item is covered by a Federal flammability
standard... a different State or local flammability requirementapplicable
to the same item will be preempted since both are designed to protect
against the same risk ....
H.R. REP. No. 1022, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976) (emphasis added).
162. In part, the preemption provision of the FHSA reads:
(B) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), if under the
regulations of the Commission promulgated under or for the enforcement
of [15 U.S.C. § 1261(q)] a requirement is established to protect against a
risk of illness or injury associated with a hazardous substance, no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect a
requirement applicable to such substance and designedto protect against the
same risk of illness or injury unless such requirement is identical to the
requirement established under such regulations.
15 U.S.C. § 1261 (note) (Supp. 1994).
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We suspect that
the preemption provisions of the CPSC uniform."
Congress used the word "requirement" in the FHSA for one simple reason:
the FHSA contains no standards setting provisions per se; it imposes standards
by declaring products that fail to meet mandated requirements to be "banned
hazardous substances." Rather than use the awkward term "banned hazardous
substance" in a preemption section, Congress chose the more generic word,
"requirement."
Similar reasons likely explain the use of this word in the MDA. That is,
Congress used the term "requirement" generically to cover the concepts of
general controls,'" performance standards, 65 and premarket approval. 6
By so doing, Congress avoided the constant need to list these concepts each
time it wished to refer to them. It certainly gave no indication that the term
included common law tort claims.
Even if Congress had other, less obvious, motives for choosing to use the
term "requirement" in the preemption section of the FHSA, we find no
evidence that Congress intended preemption under this act to apply more
broadly than in the other CPSC acts. 67 Nothing in the Consumer Product
Safety Commission Improvements Act hints this to be the case; to the
contrary, Congress emphasized the need to make the acts' preemption
provisions operate uniformly. 68
In short, we conclude that the CPSC acts approachpreemption uniformly,
that they do not bar common law tort claims,169 and that they represent a

163. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
164. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1994).
165. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1994). The Medical Device
Amendments now provide for "special controls" in addition to performance standards.

See supranote 92 and accompanying text.
166. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e (Supp. 1994).
167. The FHSA preemption provisions have not been read to displace state law
absent a congressional intent to preempt that is "clear and manifest." See Toy Mfrs.
of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 617 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to preempt
a Connecticut statute requiring toys marketed for children between the ages of three
and seven to bear a warning label that the toys contained small parts hazardous for
children under three eventhough the CPSC had regulations on small parts which it had
declined to extend to cover this situation).

168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
169. Prior to Cipollone,most courts that addressed products regulated under the
FHSA did not even address the issue of preemption. To the extent that defendants
demonstrated compliance with F-SA rules, they argued that such compliance showed
a lack of defectiveness with their products, not that it preempted the plaintiffs claims.
See, e.g., Ellis v. K-LAN Co., 695 F.2d 157, 162 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that
neither the F-SA nor any regulation promulgated under it "mandates the use of a
specific variety or form of device or warning, to the exclusion of any other or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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strong precedent for concluding that the MDA, similarly, does not bar tort
claims.
D. FDA's Interpretationof Section 360k
Another step in understanding preemption in the MDA is to examine the
FDA's interpretation of section 360k. An agency's interpretation of its own
statute has taken on added significance since the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.' In that case,
the Court established a rule that requires a reviewing court to follow an
administrative agency's interpretation of its statute where the statute presents
Despite the
ambiguities and the agency's approach is a reasonable one.'

additional devices or warnings for the same purpose, as opposed to merely setting
minimum standards or requirements"); Hickmanv. Thompson Co., 644 F. Supp. 1531,
1535 (D. Colo. 1986) (stating that compliance with FHSA constitutes a rebuttable
presumption that product is not defective).
One case prior to Cipollone did find a limited preemption under the FHSA. See
Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (W.D. Pa.
1992) (holding that the FHSA impliedly preempts certain common law tort claims).
The Lee case held that the preemption clause in the FHSA, although expressly

preempting state "regulations," did not expressly preempt common law claims. This
led the court to rule that the FHSA impliedly preempted such claims. Id. Had the
court followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Cipollone that the courts cannot find
implied preemption in a case where a statute contains an express preemption clause,

it would have clearly reached a contrary result.
Not surprisingly, however, Cipollonehas crept into at least one FHSA case. See

Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir.) (based on Cipollone, the court
concluded that the FHSA preempts certain state tort labeling claims), cert.denied, 113
S. Ct. 2999 (1993). Again, we note the illogic of applying the Cipollone court's 1992
interpretation of a term to a preemption clause enacted in 1976.
170. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
171. Chevron is consistent with a number of cases giving weight to an agency's
interpretation of its statute. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v Boston &
Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1401 (1992); Youakin v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 235
(1976); N.Y. Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973); Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1964); Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414

(1945).
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Court's spotty record in following its own rule,172 agency interpretations still
offer useful insights into how laws function.7
Two sections from the FDA's regulation on preemption are particularly
pertinent. Section 808.1(b) reads as follows:
Section [360k(a)] of the act contains special provisions governing the
regulation of devices by States and localities. That section prescribes a
general rule that after May 28, 1976, no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish or continue in effect any requirement with respect to a

medical device intended for human use having the force and effect of law
(whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court decision),
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable to
such device under any provision of the act and which relates to the safety
matter included in a
or effectiveness of the device or to any other 174
requirement applicable to the device under the act.
The phrase "whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court
decision" in section 808.1 raises an immediate question. Do the words "court

decision" extend to common law actions or do they simply cover court
decisions interpreting state statutes, ordinances, or regulations? Contrary to
several courts" '75 and one commentator's 176 conclusion that these words

172. According to Professor Thomas Merrill, during the period 1984-1990, the
Supreme Court followed the Chevron approach only in about one-third of the cases
where it was arguably relevant despite the parties' raising it with great regularity.
Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent,101 YALE L.J. 969,
980 (1992).
173. See, e.g., Orengo Caraballov. Reich, 11 F.3d. 186, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(agency's decisionis approachedwith due deference to its interpretation of statutes and

regulations whose enforcement has been committed to the agency); Chow v. I.N.S.,
12 F.3d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1993) (interpretations of ambiguous law by an executive
agency are accorded considerable weight and deference); Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.denied,

No. 93-1839, 1994 WL 210037 (1994) (reasonable interpretation by federal agency
charged with enforcing statute is entitled to due deferential treatment by a reviewing
court); Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1441 (8th Cir. 1993) (indicating that
as long as an agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable, a reviewing court
cannot replace an agency's judgment with its own).
174. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1993).
175. See, e.g., Bravman, 842 F. Supp. at 755 ("[FDA] regulations parenthetically
include court decisions in its definition of state requirements."); Lamnontagne, 834 F.
Supp. at 582 ('The FDA has interpreted Section 360k(a) of the MDA as preempting
'any requirements establishedby a state including statutes, regulations, court decisions
or ordinances."'); Reiter, 830 F. Supp. at 202; Cameron, 820 F. Supp. at 319.
176. See Ausness, supra note 14, at 283 (arguing that "FDA has specifically
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3

44

1994]

Adler and Mann: Adler: Preemption and Medical Devices

PREEAPTIONAND MEDICAL DEVICES

include common law tort claims, specific advisory opinions issued by the FDA
clarify that the latter approach is all that the FDA intended and demonstrate
that FDA has never interpreted the MDA as extending generally to common
law remedies177 or specifically to tort claims. 78
The second section relevant to assessing the FDA's view of the
preemptive effect of the MDA is section 808.1(d)(1). It reads as follows:
Section [360k(a)] does not preempt State or local requirements of general
applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates either to other

interpreted [section 360k] to preempt state tort law"). Professor Ausness never
mentions FDA's specific pronouncements on preemption of product liability laws, see
infra note 178, suggesting that his opinion of the agency's interpretation of § 360k
would change if he had done so.
177. See Letter from Joseph P. Hile, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory
Affairs, Food and Drug Administration, to Robert E. Manchester, National Women's
Health Network, (March 8, 1984). In that letter Associate Commissioner Hile states
that the preemption provisions of the Medical Device Amendments do not bar common
law remedies, such as injunction, against defective intrauterine devices. According to
Associate Commissioner Hile:
There is no indication in the legislative history of section [360k(a)] that
Congress intended that the section preempt State or local requirements
respecting general enforcement ....
Id. Associate Commissioner Hile's view is consistent with FDA's view that § 360k
does not preempt state or local requirements of "general applicability." See infra note

179.
178. See letter from Joseph Sheehan, Chief, Regulation Staff, Food and Drug
Administration to Cindy Whaley, Esquire, (February 2, 1987). In that letter Mr.
Sheehan wrote:
As you can see from these Federal Register documents, it is the Food and
Drug Administration's position that [section 360k] of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360k) preempts only state and local requirements
that are specifically related to medical devices. Therefore, FDA believes
that section [360k] does notpreemptgeneralproductliabilityrequirements.
Id. (Emphasis added). In a recent development, FDA, on November 23, 1994,
submitted an amicus curiae brief in a case, Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., CA 1, No.
94-1951, arguing that the MDA does not preempt state tort claims-particularly where
those claims arise with respect to criminal violations of the MDA. See FederalLaw

Does Not Pre-Empt Claims ConcerningNoncomplying Device, FDA Says, 22 BNA
PRODUCT SAFETY & LIAmLITY REP. 1230 (December 2, 1994). See also Richard M.
Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug
Administration, 41 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233 (1986) (article by former General
Counsel to FDA arguing that "[t]he FDA has no expertise or authority for managing
systems of redress for private injuries. The value judgment necessary for such
management-how the scales for plaintiffs and defendants should be set up-are best
left to legislatures and courts.").
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products in addition to devices (e.g., requirements such as general electrical
codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness), or to unfair

79
trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices.1

If the MDA does not preempt general bodies of law such as the UCC and
state unfair trade practices laws, afortiori,it would not preempt broader, more
established bodies of general law such as common law torts. 8 °
E. The CongressionalContext
A proper analysis of the language of section 360k requires an assessment
of the likelihood that Congress in 1976 would take the dramatic step of
enacting legislation to preempt common law tort claims without debate,
objection, or controversy. Given the explosion in the number of health and
safety laws,"' the dramatic expansion of tort doctrines,"s the furious
filing of tort suits against the Dalkon Shield during the pendency of the
MDA,' and the general approach of product liability law to recognize tort
claims despite a company's compliance with a federal regulatory
requirement,"M it is inconceivable that as Draconian a measure as
preempting common law tort claims found its way into the MDA in 1976
without one word from concerned members of Congress. The fact is that
heated congressional debates have flared up whenever any attempt to enact
broad federal product liability legislation has occurred." 5 Moreover, none

179. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1993).
180. See Mulligan, 850 F. Supp. at 635 (interpreting this section as precluding
preemption).
181. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
182. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
183. See supranote 84 and accompanying text. Not once during the extensive
process of enacting the Medical Device Amendments did a member of Congress hint
disapproval of these lawsuits or suggest that the legislature should bar future tort
claims.
184. In 1976, most courts held that compliance with a federal safety statute or
standard constituted some evidence of due care, but was not dispositive, let alone
preemptive. See, e.g., Raymondv. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (lst
Cir. 1973); LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 378 (W.D. Pa. 1967) af'd 407
F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal.
1973); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085-86 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976);
Jonescuev. Jewel Home Shopping Service, 306 N.E. 2d 312,316 (al. App. Ct. 1973);
Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W. 2d 387, 394 (Trex. Ct. Civ. App.
1968); See also, EDWARD M. SwARTZ, HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS LmGATION (1973).
This view generally prevailed until the Supreme Court's ruling in Cipollone.
185. In the early 1970s, product liability insurance rates increased dramatically,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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of these attempts has succeeded.186 With respect to medical devices
specifically, congressional supporters of tort reform, having repeatedly tried
and failed to bar tort claims against products complying with FDA
regulations," have retreated to attempting to prevent the imposition of
punitive damages against products that comply with FDA requirements."
Even these more modest provisions have failed to pass Congress.'9

prompting Congress to appoint an Interagency Task Force on Product Liability in
1976. The Task force issued a report in 1978 calling for reforms in the product
liability system. See INTERAGENcY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LBIirry,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FiNAL REPORT VII at 242-57 (1978) (calling for reforms
in product liability law). Shortly thereafter, members of Congress began introducing
proposals for federal product liability legislation. See Sheila I. Birnbaum, Legislative
Reform or Retreat? A Response to the ProductLiability Crisis, 14 FORUM 251, 259
(1978) (noting that approximately 20 product liability bills were introduced in the 95th
Congress). In the decades since, numerous such bills have been introduced in
Congress. See, e.g., Hearingson S. 1400, the ProductLiability Reform Act, Before
the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportationon S. 1400, the ProductLiability Reform Act, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1990) (statement by Senator Richard Bryan, Chairman, that Congress has been
grappling with "controversial" product liability issues "for a good many years"). At
these hearings, Senator Slade Gorton noted that the issue of product liability "is not
new.... The debate heats up when the different factions-business, consumer groups
and lawyers-attempt to craft a solution." Id. at 5.
186. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
187. Beginning in 1977 with the National Product Liability Insurance Act, S. 403,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), a bill that would have made compliance with federal laws
and regulations a complete defense to product liability claims, members of Congress
have sought unsuccessfully to bar tort claims against products in compliance with
federal rules. Having failed at that, congressional opponents of the product liability
system unsuccessfully sought to enact more modest legislation that would bar claims
only against FDA and FAA-premarket approved products. Accordingly, Senator
Robert Kasten, the principal congressional proponent of federal product liability
legislation, sought an even more modest approach. In 1990, he stated that S. 1400, the
bill then pending before Congress, had been modified from bills introduced in previous
years to eliminate "[c]ompliance with [FDA] standards defenses for compensatory
damages..., an issue that we have discussedwhich was contentious." See Hearings
on S. 1400 Before the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation,101st Cong., 2d Sess 315 (1990). S. 1400,
which would have barred punitive damages for products having premarket approval
from the FDA or FAA, also failed to pass-as have all recent similar measures. See
infra note 189 and iccompanying text.

188. See id. at 26 (S. 1400 §303(c)(1)).
189. The most recent Senate bill, S. 687, failed, in June 1994, to pass the Senate.
See ProductLiabili LegislationDefeatedAs Senate FailsTwice To CurtailFilibuster,
22 PRODUCT SAFETY AND LiABmrrY REP. 663 (1994). Opponents have prevented a
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In short, to suggest that in 1976 Congress had any intention to bar tort
claims is to ignore history and reality. If ever there were an instance in which
significance should attach to congressional silence ("the dog that didn't bark"),
preempting tort claims is it. In view of the profound congressional silence
regarding tort claims, it makes no sense to interpret the MDA as preempting
such claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
The net effect of the courts' post-Cipollone rulings with respect to
preemption under the MDA is ominous. Sacrificing consumer health and

safety based on a vague sense that medical technology cannot progress in the
face of tort claims, 190 and adopting the unsubstantiated view that Congress
placed total faith in the FDA's ability to monitor the medical device
marketplace for health and safety," the recent preemption rulings refuse to

floor vote on similar bills in the House of Representatives. Id. at 664.
190. In fact, despite the outcry about the negative impact of government
regulation and product liability litigation during the past twenty years, the United
States continues to dominate the $36 billion world-wide market in new medical
technologies and in exports. See Foote, supra note 82, at 179; Michael C. Fuchs,
Economics of U.S. Trade in Medical Technology and Export PromotionActivities of
the U.S. DepartmentofCommerceinEstrin, supranote 82, at 917 (describing how in
1987 the U.S. share of world-wide production of medical technologies constituted
roughly 60 percent). This is similar to the situation with respect to drugs. See
InnovationinMedicines,WASH. POST, March 14, 1990 (noting that the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association reports that the U.S. leads in the discovery of world class
drugs with the origin of 25 new drugs marketed by the U.S. out of a total of 60 new
drugs worldwide).
191. To the contrary, Congress has repeatedly identified shortcomings in FDA's
regulation of medical devices. See, e.g., SUBCOMMIrTEE ON OVERSIGHT &
INVESTIGATIONS, HousE COMMrrFEE ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, LESS THAN THE
SUM OF ITS PARTS: REFORMS NEEDED IN THE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND
RESOURCES OF THE "FDA's CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); STAFF OF HousE COMiVTTEE ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, THE
BjORK-SHILEY HEART VALVE: "EARN As You LEARN," 101 Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL, MEDICAL DEVICES:
EARLY WARNING OF PROBLEMS IS HAMPERED BY SEVERE UNDERREPORTING (1986)

(report by congressionally operated watchdog department); FDA's Neglected Child,
supra note 6; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL,

To BE OVERCOME
(1993); HearingsBefore Senate Committee on Aging on PacemakersRevisited:A Saga
of Benign Neglect, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); HearingsBefore Subcommittee on
Oversight & Investigations of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce on
AnaesthesiaMachine Failures, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Hearings Before the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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permit severely injured consumers from even entering the courtroom. Thus,
consumers are prevented from arguing that their injuries have resulted from
poorly designed products, defectively manufactured devices, devices with
inadequate warnings, devices approved by the FDA due to manufacturerfraud,
and devices that long ago should have been removed from the market. 1"
The courts have done so despite a lack of evidence that Congress intended to
preempt such claims.
To comprehend the impact of what the courts have done, the reader need
only imagine what would happen if A.H. Robins introduced the Dalkon Shield
after the enactment of the MDA rather than in 1970. To say the least, the

Subcommittee on Oversight& Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
In addition to these negative reports by Congress, other observers have been
critical of FDA, among other reasons, for providing loopholes in regulating medical
devices, failing properly to review drugs and devices, failing to review adverse
experience reports carefully and expeditiously, slowing investigations under political
pressure and lacking adequate authority to remove dangerous products. See JoINT
REPORT BY CONSUMERS UNION, PUBLIC CITIZEN, CITIZEN ACTION, U.S. PUBLIC
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, AND THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, S. 687,
"M
PRODUCT LIAILrry FAIRNESS ACT" IS UNIFORMLY UNFAIR TO CONSUMERS,
A-1 to A-13 (Winter 1994) (report by coalition of consumer groups opposing
provisions in pending product liability legislation that would exempt manufacturers in
compliance with FDA rules from punitive damages); Daniel W. Sigelman, Turning the
Tables on Drug Companies:Exposing Deficienciesin FDA Regulation 30 TRIAL 72
("Implicit in the 'FDA approval defense' is the assumption that agency regulation
protects the public from the dangers of marketed drugs. Congressional oversight of
FDA's performance, however, challenges the validity of this assumption.").
192. For example, intraocular devices, because of a special provision in the law,
have been permitted to conduct so-called "adjunct studies," that permit substantial
numbers of lenses to enter the market for commercial purposes. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 813.50 (1993) (exempting intraocular lenses from "no-commercialization"
restrictions). Hundreds of thousands of such lenses have been sold over the years
without ever being submitted for premarket approval. In fact, many of them have been
withdrawn from the market because the manufacturers realized that the IOLs would
not meet FDA requirements for safety and effectiveness. At the time FDA issued its
final rule regarding IOLs as investigational devices, it specifically stated that "[i]t is
not the duty of FDA to protect [IOL manufacturers] or investigators from lawsuits by
subjects." 42 Fed. Reg. 58874, 58881 (1977). Injured consumers have filed lawsuits
contending that some IOL manufacturers, knowing that their products would never

gain FDA approval, nevertheless took advantage of their investigational status to keep
them on the market and reap substantial profits. See, e.g., Angelle v. Intermedical
Intraocular, Inc., No. 93-0403, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17805 at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 10,
1993) (asserting that defendant IOL manufacturer used its investigational statute for
more than six years "as a guise to market its lenses commercially," despite never filing
for premarket approval).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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results would be catastrophic. First, the device would enter the market
through a "510(k) notification" by claiming "substantial equivalence" to, one
of the many pre-MDA IUDs." Despite the fact that it had never obtained
premarket approval for the Dalkon Shield, A.H. Robins would argue for, and
likely receive, summary dismissal of cases against it based on preemption.'
With cases against Robins dismissed by summary judgment, it is unlikely that
the extent of the company's iniquity ever would emerge. Robins' dishonesty
regarding the efficacy of its device,195 its refusal to conduct adequate testing
of the Dalkon Shield,' its ignoring of numerous adverse reports from
physicians," its attacks on the personal character of victims in product
liability lawsuits, 9' and, ultimately, its suppression and illegal destruction
of damning evidence against it99 were uncovered only after years of product
liability litigation, some of which was unsuccessful because of Robins'
suppression of critical evidence. In fact, none of this evidence was sought, or
discovered, by the FDA. To the contrary, the FDA turned its attention away
from the Dalkon Shield after negotiating a "voluntary" suspension of sales in
the United States on June 26, 1974.200 Not until 1984, ten years later, after
193. See supranote 107. Even as revised by the Safe Medical Devices Act of
1990, § 510(k) remains the preferred route to market for mostmedical devices. There
is little doubt that an IUD like the Dalkon Shield would have followed this route rather
than obtaining premarket approval.
194. The only post-Cipollone ruling of which we are aware that rejected
preemption for a Class Ill device that reached the market through "510 notification"
is Larsenv. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P. 2d 1273 (Haw. 1992). On the other hand,
cases such as Cameron v. Howmedica, Div. of Pfizer Hosp., 820 F. Supp. 317 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) and Griffin v. Medtronic, 840 F. supp. 396 (D. Md. 1994), inwhich the
courts unhesitatingly imposed preemption even in the absence of any counterpart FDA
regulation, convince us that the courts have run amok.
195. At the time the Dalkon Shield was marketed, Robins claimed a pregnancy
rate of 1.1 percent despite having information in its files showing that the true
pregnancy rate was many times that. See Sobol, supra note 84, at 5.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. at 8-9.
198. Id. at 13.
199. Id. at 21-22. One of Robins' defense attorneys, Roger Tuttle, eventually
suffered regrets and, on July 30, 1984, in a deposition, confessed that he had been
ordered to destroy incriminating documents by William Forrest, general counsel to
A.H. Robins. Instead of destroying them, he had secreted them away and revealed
them during the deposition. See also Morton Mintz, Dalkon Shield Papers Were
Burned,Says Ex-Robins Attorney, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1984 at A14; Mary Williams
Walsh,Robins Ex-OfficialSays He DestroyedDalkonShield Data,WALL ST. J., Aug.
1, 1984 at 19.
200. See Sobol, supranote 84, at 10. Robins continued selling the Dalkon Shield
for months after its voluntary withdrawal in at least forty foreign countries.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/3
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being publicly castigated by a federal judge overseeing a group of product
liability cases," 1 did Robins finally begin a campaign to convince women
to have the IUDs removed.
In short, had preemption been applied to the Dalkon Shield, A.H. Robins
would have succeeded in operating incompetently and illegally. More
importantly, hundreds of thousands of injured women would have been denied
recompense and justice.
We think preemption of product liability claims against medical device
manufacturers is misplaced-at least without careful thought and a precise
plan for offsetting approaches to protect consumers. Innovation without
protection hardly improves the lives of our citizens and, despite its
commendable efforts on behalf of the public, the FDA by itself simply cannot
provide an adequate source of safety to the public from dangerous medical
devices.
We hope that the courts, upon reflection, will reconsider their preemption
rulings and stop barring claims filed by injured consumers. In the absence of
such a reconsideration, we call upon the Food and Drug Administration to
clarify in more forceful terms its view that agency regulations do not support
the courts' misguided interpretation that the FDA endorses preemption of tort
claims. Ultimately, however, Congress may have to re-enter the picture with
definitive language clarifying the exact scope of preemption under the Medical
Device Amendments.

201. Federal Judge Miles Lord, stated in an emotional appeal, directly to company
president E. Claibome Robins and General Counsel, William Forrest:
Under your direction, your company has in fact continued to allow women,
tens of thousands of them, to wear this device-a deadly depth charge in
their wombs ready to explode at any time .... The only conceivable
reasons you have not recalled this product are that it would hurt your

balance sheet and alert womenwho have already beenharmed that youimay
liable for their injuries ....
If this were a case in equity, I would order your company to make an
effort to locate each and every womanwho stillwears this device and recall
your product. But this court does not have the power to do so. I must
therefore resort to moral persuasion and a personal appeal to each of
you .... Please, in the name of humanity, lift your eyes above the bottom
line ....

Please, gentlemen, give consideration to tracing down the victims

and sparing them the agony that will surely be theirs.
Quoted in id. at 20. See also Morton Mintz, U.S. Judge Assails Officers of Dalkon
ShieldMaker, WAsH. POST, Mar. 2, 1984 at A4.
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